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In 2006, Roger Eatwell introduced the concept of “Cumulative Extremism”, after he observed 
violent clashes between radical right- and radical Islamist groups in Britain. In 2012, their sister 
groups, Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League, established themselves in 
Norway. However, in contrast to the British case, they never displayed any signs of inter-group 
radicalization. This dissertation has two main contributions. First, it introduces a new concept: 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Second, it analyzes two cases of inter-group 
radicalization through three independent variables, which dependent on their temporal state, act 
either as limiting or facilitating political opportunity structures for “HRR”. The comparative 
analysis indicates that ideologies, counter-radicalization measures and inter-group competition 
functioned as limiting political opportunity structures for inter-group radicalization between 
Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League in the period 2012-2014. The thesis 
finds the same variables to be facilitating opportunity structures for similar processes between 















During the past decade, a number of scholars have narrowed their attention to the relationship 
between the radical-right and radical Islamic movements. In 2005, Roger Eatwell developed a 
new concept of inter-group radicalization when he observed clashes between far-right members 
and radical Islamists in Britain. He noted that it had occurred a process of “Cumulative 
Extremism” among oppositional extremist groups. “[…] extremist animosities fueling each 
other” (Eatwell, 2006: 213).  
“Eatwell’s argument is that extremists of both groups effectively enter a ‘cumulative’ process whereby the activity 
of one group leads the activity of another to become more extreme or provocative, which in turn may further 
radicalize the other group and so on.” (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 3-4). 
Not only is this phenomenon observable in western Europe in modern times, but there also 
exists empirical evidence of similar occurrences all the way back to the 1960s (Bosi et al, 2014). 
Post-war Britain experienced four waves of movement-counter movement contests, including 
two periods with spirals and escalations of violence between the extreme-right and anti-fascists 
between the 1970s and early 1990s (Maklin and Busher, 2014: 56-57). In Italy, spirals of 
revenge emerged between the left-wing group and neo-fascists in the 1970s (Della Porta, 2013: 
70-71). Finally, in Basque country, growing nationalism produced conflicts between the 
separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and traditionalist factions between the mid-70s 
and the early 80s (Della Porta, 2013: 90-97).   
This thesis seeks to investigate the dynamics of inter-group radicalization in a Norwegian 
context. Between 2012 and 2014, the country experienced the co-existence of two radical 
groups on national soil: Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League. The NDL was 
intended to work as a Norwegian affiliation of the English Defence League, operating with the 
same “counter-jihadi” ideology (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). Profetens Ummah had close contact 
with the British group Al-Mujahiroun, illustrated by the cooperation between PU’s leader 
Ubaydullah Hussain and Anjem Chouadry. The latter stated in 2013 that he was the mentor and 
counselor of the Norwegian affiliation (NTB, 2013: c)   
Could the interaction between far-right- and radical Islamic groups result in mechanisms of 
reciprocal radicalization? If groups with similar ideologies had engaged in violent conflicts in 
Britain, it could very well have the same consequences in Norway. Four years after his initial 
report, Eatwell stated that “processes of Cumulative Extremism (CE) could be ‘‘more 
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threatening to the liberal democratic order than attacks from lone wolf extreme Right-Wingers 
or even Al-Qaida-inspired spectacular bombings” (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 884).  
While Eatwell’s statement from 2010 might be a bit farfetched, empirical findings demonstrate 
that interactions between radical groups can produce escalations of violence in western-
European countries (Della Porta, 2013; Bosi et al, 2014). This is not just the case for Italy, 
Britain, and the Basque country, but even Norway experienced the escalations of political 
violence and radicalization of far right and radical-left groups in the 1990s and early 2000s 
(Bjørgo et al, 2001; Bjørgo 2005; Fangen, 2001; Fangen, 2001 b; Kallevik, 2013).  
Few can deny the destructive consequences of radicalization and especially terrorism on the 
global scale. To minimize their impact, a detailed mapping of mechanisms in play will certainly 
become important to tackle the problem in more efficient matters. Although much research 
exists in the field of radicalization, the interrelationship between radical Islamism and the 
“counter-Jihadi” aspect of the radical right seems to be rather undiscovered in many national 
contexts. For instance, the interrelationship between Profetens Ummah – and subgroups within 
the Norwegian far right movement remains mostly absent from the wide range of national 
research (Bjørgo & Gjeldsvik: 2015).  
This thesis has two main goals. First, various academics have highlighted the need for 
conceptual changes regarding inter-group relationships, which is something that this thesis 
seeks to correct. Here, the thesis applies Alex Schmid’s definition of radicalization (Schmid, 
2013). Deeper understanding of the phenomenon in a context-independent setting is valuable 
because reciprocal inter-group radicalization has occurred in multiple countries in the past, and 
it might very well become a challenge for democracies in the future. Second, the thesis seeks 
to explain the phenomenon in a specific national context. The dynamics between Norwegian 
counter-jihadism and radical Islamism has not undergone much analysis. Learning history 
strengthens our abilities to tackle the future.   
This study is a comparative analysis of two cases of inter-group interactions, a process that the 
thesis labels as “Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization”. The first case regards the conflicts 
between the anti-racist and neo-Nazi movements in Norway in the 1990s/early 2000s. The 
dissertations defines this as a positive case of HRR, which is because interactions between them 
resulted in escalations of violence over longer periods in time. The second case is the least 
illuminated, and is subject to the most attention in the thesis. The two groups in question are 
the radical Islamist group Profetens Ummah, and the radical right group Norwegian Defence 
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League, which co-existed and interacted in the period between 2012 and 2014. Here, we find 
no evidence of escalations of radicalism, and the case is thus perceived as a deviant or negative 
instance of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.  
To understand the different outcomes between the two cases, the thesis analyzes what Social 
Movement Theory calls political opportunity structures. David Meyer explains these as 
exogenous factors that facilitate or limit mobilization, and ultimate define a group’s strategies 
(Meyer, 2004: 1457-1458). The analysis uses three independent variable to explain why the 
change in political opportunity structures limited Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the 
second case, but facilitated the same process in the 1990s/2000s. The central research question 
is this thesis is the following:  
Why did Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization occur between anti-racist and neo-Nazi groups, 
but not between Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League? 
To discover how certain opportunity structures limited or facilitated the phenomenon, the thesis 
analyses ideologies, counter-radicalization measures and inter-group competition. The thesis 
finds that the collective effects of the independent variables were indeed limiting opportunity 
structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization for Profetens Ummah and Norwegian 
Defence League, while the same variables functioned as facilitating structures for HRR in the 
first case. The effects of the variables are perceived as interconnected; social movements and 
their sub-groups operate within societies where there are different actors and highly complex 












2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Radicalization: literature and definitions 
“The Trouble with Radicalization” 
(Neumann, 2013) 
Extreme ideologies, political violence and terrorism became well-known subjects of research 
during the course of the 20th century. Today, there are abundant amounts of academic 
contributions tied to the phenomena of radicalization. As illustrated by the title of an article 
written by Peter Neumann from 2013, there are certain difficulties tied to the concept itself. 
Should one review the existing literature on the matter, it would not be hard to find definitional 
disagreement between scholars. Consequently, what is radicalization? Essentially, the notion is 
divided between an emphasis on extremist beliefs and extremist behavior (Neumann, 2013: 
873).  
Neumann labels the two approaches for “Anglo-Saxon” and “European” (Neumann, 2013). As 
freedom of speech is absolute in the former, the peaceful practice of personal political ideas 
remains permissible. On the other hand, an actor’s intention to break the law through violent 
means is considered to be a great danger for democratic nations. Some policies are therefore 
developed with the intention of functioning as short-term counter-terrorism (Neumann, 2013: 
885-86). On the contrary, the European definition places larger emphasis on the behavioral 
aspect, but keeps violent extremism incorporated as one of two end-states of the radicalization 
process. Ideas and thoughts are perceived as potentially problematic and dangerous for the 
constitutional order. The radicalization process is then ultimately understood as a long-term, 
gradual development (Neumann, 2013: 886-887).  
Which approach is the more appropriate? Neumann argues for the merge of the two, thereby 
incorporating both long- and short-term policies. To understand the complexity between ideas 
and behavior, one should not overlook neither component (Neumann, 2013: 889). The argument 
reemerges in Alex Schmid’s definition of radicalization from 2013, which he developed after 
reviewing a great number of empirical findings on the matter:  
“An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarization, normal 
practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are 
abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational 
tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various 
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forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war 
crimes” (Schmid, 2013: 18).  
Schmid’s definition is the most appropriate in many aspects. First, research on radicalization 
and terrorism has been making enormous progress since the 1980s, although especially post- 
September 11, 2001 (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). Certain old notions have been abandoned, 
like the perception of radicalized individuals or groups as non-rational actors. Now, most 
scholars acknowledge that interests and goals drive actions, radicalized actors are therefore 
considered as rational (Borum, 2011a: 14).  
Second, Schmid remains careful when he incorporates actions and believes into his definition. 
It is both understandable and practical that some governments chose to focus on actions when 
they mobilize for counter-terrorism: attacks can have a significant psychological effect on 
societies. However, we should not overlook the power of ideas. One can neutralize various 
actors from ever acting in a radical fashion, but that will not stop an ideological narrative, which 
will continue to feed future radicalization. Some have later highlighted the need for more 
counter-narratives, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 2015: 
16-17).  
We should also merge beliefs with actions; Alex Schmid understands radicalization as a 
gradual process. When does one become a radical? According to Bailey and Edwards, there 
cannot be drawn any specific end-point, but it rather envelops the entire journey from thoughts 
to (possible) actions. Their argument is drawn from McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) which 
suggest that radicalization is changes of ideas and actions “in the direction” of conflict. As they 
elegantly describe it: radicalization is to radical, as aging is to aged (Bailey & Edwards, 2017: 
261-262) 
Third, the word “Radical” loses its meaning when it is isolated from a societal context. We 
need to establish a specific understanding of “legal” political behavior to locate radical ideas 
and actions thereafter. National jurisdiction tend to vary on numerous matters, as seen through 
substantial differences in Canadian and Australian anti-terrorism laws (Roach, 2007: 53). Put 
differently, the term is relative (Sedgwick, 2010; Neumann, 2013: 876-78). Schmid sees this as 
dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors: the democratic ideal. He furtherly 
defines the concept:  
“The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from 
mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous 
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world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political 
order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate” (Schmid, 2013: 18). 
Finally, Schmid’s extensive definition removes particular shortcomings that other definitions 
may suffer from. While a portion of the established interpretations choose to focus on actions 
(Olesen 2009; Githens-Mazer, 2009), others prefer to use ideas and narrative as their primary 
variable (Horgan & Bradock, 2010; Sinai, 2012). As previously noted, Schmid defines 
radicalism in a political context. As a second component, he defines radical political actions (or 
radicalism) with three indicators: “non-violence”, “political violence” and “terrorism” (Schmid, 
2013: 18).  
A process of radicalization is therefore a gradual progression towards three concrete forms of 
radical activity. This increases definitional clarity and measurement potential through multiple 
distinguishable end-states. The latter would certainly help if one seeks to explore possible 
contextual interrelations between the three indicators (Bartlett & Miller, 2011: 4-5).  
 
2.1.1. Clarifying non-violent actions 
Pressure and coercion are incorporated in the non-violent part of the radicalization definition. 
However, what these notions actually represent is not clarified any further, which makes any 
operationalization quite difficult. Which forms of non-violence can be both defined as “radical” 
and be observable by scholars? The spread of propaganda through the internet has become a 
strong source of influence. Various texts and multimedia online reinforce collective identities 
based on ideological grounds (Archetti, 2015). Alex Schmid specifies that: 
“[…] Compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by 
one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of 
conflict-waging” (Schmid, 2013: 18). 
A non-violent radicalization is measurable by observing changes in narrative. Here, discourse 
comes both in physical- and non-physical form. The physical form of narrative and a shift of 
outgroup perceptions translates through the increased appeal for confrontational tactics, which 
might be facilitated by alienating opponents. A great number of radical groups have websites, 
journals and other forms of literature online. As one of many, the Islamic State (IS) has given 
out several editions of its journal, the Dabiq (Ingram, 2015: 732).  
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Linked to the process of Cumulative Extremism, Busher and Maklin also state that abusive and 
threatening language can have damaging effects. This is a phenomenon which is observable 
both off-and on-line, especially with the help of frequent reports by victims. A measurable 
increase in these kinds of confrontational activities could provoke responsive behavior and 
contribute to an intensification of the inter-group dynamics (Busher and Maklin, 2015: 888).  
The former non-violent forms could be said to be indirect because there are no clear direct 
interactions with outgroup members. Coercion is defined as varieties of intimidation and threats 
or some form of pressure or force. It is possible that group members could contact outgroup 
individuals with the goal of stopping their radical activity. Intimidations and threats towards 
individuals, families or social networks are non-violent methods that have been efficient.  
 
2.1.2. A sidenote on political violence 
Measuring the radicalization of any individual, group or movement is a difficult task. If a 
possible end-state of a radicalization process is violence by either terrorism or political violence, 
we need to establish what really defines them. Alex Schmid claims that political violence is 
indeed very different from terrorism (Schmid, 2013).  
First, political violence can come as a response to a repressive state. Since this is not the case 
for the Norwegian state apparatus, we need to base the analysis on a situation where the rule of 
law is established. Schmid explains that when a country applies the rule of law, confrontation 
is understood as form of oppositional politics. It is also free and persuasive politics, until 
escalations result in actions that are not necessarily legal. Concrete examples are hate crimes, 
public property damage, violent demonstrations or riots (Schmid, 2013: 13-15).  
Terrorism then, belongs to a special category of violence. Political terrorism is a strategy of 
provocation; in most cases, the target is chosen more or less arbitrarily. Its strategy is one of 
fear-generating actions, but without legal and moral restraints. Civilians are in general the more 
strategically efficient targets, the propagandist and psychological effects leads to polarization 
as well as increased bottom-up political pressure (Schmid, 2013: 16-17). This can in some cases 
lead to irrational decisions from governments. The US military interventions in the Middle East 
at the turn of the 21th century might very well be one example of such politically “pressured” 






In 2016, the Norwegian police security service (PST) viewed radical Islamism and the radical 
right as two potentially dangerous movements that could become serious threats to the 
Norwegian society (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2016: a). Whom do we locate into these 
movements? The world is not as simple as claimed by many radicals. A dualistic perception of 
antagonists and protagonists generalizes different masses in society, and denotes the 
counterpart as “evil” or “incompatible” with their own goals. Security agencies have directed 
their attention on radicalized individuals, which are quite different compared to the majority of 
the population. How they are discerned becomes facilitated by definitions of “radicalism”, like 
Alex Schmid presents in his summarizing paper on radicalization and extremism (Schmid, 
2013).  
Schmid argues that radicalism has to be located relative to mainstream, status quo political 
activities. “Moderate” political activity would therefore incorporate populism, which is in many 
states viewed as a political movement with relatively unusual policies compared to their 
opponents. Regardless of which political beliefs a populist political party may hold, most still 
accept the political- and legal path as legitimate (Schmid, 2013: 7). However, radicalism is 
neither legal, nor typical political. Other scholars have also used similar arguments to make the 
same distinction. Social movement theorists McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly label political violence 
as “contentious politics”, under which they bridge revolutions, civil wars and others (Della 
Porta, 2012: 244).  
McCauley and Moskalenko also discuss the distinction between “activists” and “radicals”. 
Activists do not accept the usage of violent and illegal means, but radicals might and can 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2010). Schmid supplements this by arguing that radicals can also 
be non-violent. Two specific traits stand out: First, they do not accept the current state of 
society. Second, they want to transform the system through non-violent and democratic means; 
or by using violent and illegal methods (Schmid, 2013: 7-8).  
 
2.2.2. The radical right:  
Schmid’s discussion of the terms “radicalism” and “extremism” concludes that the use of 
“extremist” in a context of non-violence would not be empirically justified. On major source of 
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confusion arises because many chose to tie “radical” and “extreme” to general political 
populism. “When there is overlap on the far right between extreme rightism, electoral-focused 
organizations and violent, non-parliamentary movements, again there is scope for confusion 
and interpretation” (Hainsworth 2008: 8).  
The Norwegian historian Øystein Sørensen argues for 3 degrees of extremes: populism is the 
most moderate variant; radicalism is in the middle, and extremism the most “undemocratic” 
(Sørensen et al, 2012: 10-11). In this thesis, radicalism is defined by the acceptance of violent 
and illegal means to achieve an ideological goal. Logically, Populism is ruled out because the 
term characterizes political activity within the legal framework of society. The next step is to 
merge extremism and radicalism into a slightly more including term, as argued by Alex P. 
Schmid: Radicalism. The term detains a non-violent acceptance of violence as well as the 
willingness to use violent measures as defined by “violent extremism”. What then defines the 
Radical Right? 
Although the movement consists of a multitude of ideologically heterogeneous groups, some 
key traits stand out across various groups and national borders. First, parts of the ideology has 
a clear anti-systemic value, hence the abolishment of the liberal democratic state is necessary. 
Second, the radical right ideology is somewhat extensive, and needs to encompass all spheres 
of life. Third, radicals use historical revisionism to challenge historical facts and delegitimize 
official histography (Wolf, 2016: 147-149). 
The non-acceptance of multiculturalism (and especially anti-Islam) has become the central 
ideological component of certain fractions within the radical right movement, as well as for a 
majority of populist political parties in the course of the last decades. Nevertheless, this trait 
isn’t necessarily fundamental for subgroups within the general movement. Carter as well as 
Strømmen highlight five recurrent ideological features: nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-
democratic sentiments and the call for a strong state (Carter, 2005: 14-15; Strømmen, 2013: 
27). As we can see, anti-jihadism is just one of many defining features within the radical-right. 
For instance, neo-Nazism and fascism remain pillars of the movement. However, anti-jihadism 
is the central (radical-right) ideological component in this thesis.  
Historically, the radical right has generally formed and flourished after disintegrations of the 
social order. The primary force for these types of mass developments has been forms of 
modernization (Della Porta, 2013: 72). The influx of immigrants into European nations due to 
globalization, terrorism caused by Islamic terrorist groups and waves of economic recessions 
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are some the main drivers behind this ideological success. Immigrants are perceived as a danger 
for the indigenous culture and identity, often explained through nativism in the populist/radical 
right ideology (Mudde, 2007: 69-87; Ivarsflaten, 2008: 14-17). A belief of racial/cultural 
superiority drives the identity crisis, coupled with a strong xenophobia (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 
7).  
The “Islamization” of the western world through influxes of immigration has become a great 
concern for a great number of radical rightists. As Kundnani observes, the English Defense 
League differs from the traditional far right because of its “anti-jihadist” doctrine. Its main 
protagonist is Islam and Muslims, which they believe act as a repressor of their native culture. 
Multiculturalism becomes somewhat of a secondary concern, mainly because it enables the 
Islamization of the society (Kundnani, 2012: 3). The closer absence of a traditional 
distributional debate differentiates such radical-right groups from populist ideology; the non-
acceptance of Islam is certainly a rising thematic. Although scholarly literature mixed the 
notions, here we find an emerging ideological emphasis of several groups: counter-jihadism 
(Kundnani, 2012: 1).  
Some ideologues who belong to this growing movement have been great sources of inspiration 
for prominent radical right militants. For instance, Anders Behring Breivik’s perception of 
reality was inspired significantly by the work of Serge Trifkovic as well as Peder Nøstvold 
Jensen, known by the pseudonym “Fjordman” (Strømmen, 2011: 65-57; 70-71). Toby Archer 
argues that fundamentally, the “anti-jihadi” movement has been a product of the US terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 coupled with the interconnectivity that followed the growth of the internet 
(Taylor et al, 2013: 173-174). In any case, counter-jihadism has the power to mobilize 
individuals or groups with violent intentions.  
 
2.2.3. Radical Islamism:  
The significant number of terrorist attacks in Europe the past years has created an aggrandizing 
psychological pressure on residing Muslim communities. Ever since 9/11, specific minority 
groups have suffered from responsabilization of terrorism, presumably stemming from labelling 
from the media, the general population and security agencies (Mythen et al, 2009). A significant 
problem is that the phenomenon acts as a vicious circle;  we experience a polarizing effect on 
society as long as a there is a lack of a clear differentiation. “What kind” of ideology defines 
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radical Islamism, compared to a moderate, peaceful and modern version of Islam practiced by 
nearly all Muslims in European societies?  
“’Islamism’ is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest 
of the world by all means” (Mozaffari, 2007: 21). 
Mehdi Mozzafari developed this definition of Islamism with the goal of a clear differentiation 
between moderate and radical Islam. Interchangeable terms like “radical Islam” and “Islamic 
fundamentalism” reflect the desire to define the new form of faith that emerged and developed 
from colonial times until 9.11.2001 (Mozaffari, 2007: 17-19). “Islamism” reflects a new 
configuration of Islamic activism: it has become less political, more religious, increasingly 
violent, critical towards the West and hostile towards established regimes in the Arab world 
(Mozaffari, 2007: 18).  
Mozaffari’s definition has four important components. First, the ideology is religious. Second, 
the holistic interpretation of Islam means that religion embraces every aspect of social life: the 
Sharia laws must characterize the societal structure. Ideologues like Said Qutb, Khomeini and 
al-Banna have contributed to the totalitarian aspect of Islamism through diverse writings that 
would later become ideological ground pillars (Mozaffari, 2007: 23). This extensiveness is quite 
similar to the one found in the radical right narrative.  
Third, radical Islamism wants the proliferation of its religious doctrines. Repressive states 
pressured by “anti-Islamic” governments have to be replaced with societies that correspond to 
an ideal reference point. In essence, there lies a wish for religious universalism which corrects 
repression in the existing world (Mozaffari, 2007: 21-23), an anti-systemic notion that is also 
shared by some within the radical right movement. In both Salafism and Wahhabism, there has 
occurred major ideological changes: a transformation from a national/regional ideology 
towards transnationalism, inspired primarily by al-Qaeda post-9/11. Lorenzo characterizes this 
phenomenon as “global Jihad”: the ideological goal of terrorist groups to obtain a transnational 
agenda (Bosi et al, 2014: 277).  
The last part states that a world conquest should require all means, although this is a vague 
point that needs clarification. Radical Islamist groups do not chose violent strategies the 
majority of the time; it has been used few times relative to other means. This depends on 
affiliated groups, the specific time in history, and structural opportunities (Mozaffari, 2007: 24). 
In many ways, radical Islamism shares common traits with counter-jihadism or Nazism/neo-
Nazism. For instance, both factions have dualistic and exclusive views of the world where one 
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or many groups are alienated and perceived as dangerous for their protected collective. This 
ideological relationship one of several components that will be furtherly analyzed in this thesis.  
 
2.3. The process of radicalization  
As scholars moved away from understanding terrorism as irrational behavior, the field of 
radicalization has favored radical activities as part of a larger dynamic process. There are 
multiple levels of analysis, from the individual level to groups, networks, organizations, 
movements, socio-cultural contexts and international-interstate contexts. Actors enter processes 
of radicalization through different forms of “pathways”. This notion interplays with a variety 
of factors, like national economies and politics as well as the individual and collective 
psychology (Borum, 2011: 14-15). Radicalization is thus a process driven by a certain 
complexity. The lack of a general theoretical framework for entangled systemic dynamics is 
problematic, but we do find appropriate interpretive frameworks for inter-group dynamics 
between radical right- and radical Islamic groups.  
Different theories reflect distinctive ways of looking at the dynamic process of radicalization. 
As Walter Laqueur states: “one should not try to develop a general theory of terrorism, it is a 
dynamic process dependent on its time and national context” - the same applies for 
radicalization (Borum, 2011: 15). Say we compare both Paris terrorist attacks (2015) to Anders 
Behring Breivik’s actions in Norway (2011). It would certainly be difficult to believe that the 
“lone wolf” profile of Breivik has emerged from similar processes of radicalization as the two 
Kouachi brothers, or Salah Abdeslam’s network. The same applies for the complex interactions 
between individuals, groups and state actors: it is quite difficult to generalize distinct processes.   
A structured overview of applicable theories figures in Crossett and Spitaletta’s literature 
review from 2010. Here, the scholars discuss strengths and weaknesses of 16 theories from 
different disciplines. First, most psychological, psychoanalytic and cognitive theories seem to 
have a strong applicability for mechanisms of individual/group radicalization. This is in 
relationship to both in-group and out-group ties, meaning members within their group as well 
as actors towards whom they have a competitive or hostile perception. Hence, studies target 
micro- level human behavior and mental functions (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010). Since this 
thesis focuses primarily on inter-group dynamics, these theories seem to have limited relevance.   
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This problem of applicability is also the case for some social science theories. For example, 
Relative Deprivation Theory focuses on economic disparities as a source of radicalization, but 
lacks a more substantial analysis of inter-group relations (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 14-15). 
The same problem is recurrent in Social Network Theory, where person-to-person associations 
is studied more closely than group dynamics (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 16-17).  
 
2.3.1. Social psychology 
Two sets of theories strikes as relevant for the study of inter-group dynamics. First, there is 
Group Dynamic Theory from the socio-psychological subfield. Group dynamic theory focuses 
mostly on small groups but is in practice applicable to the study of larger groups and mass-
movements. (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 22-24). Social psychological models like Moskalenko 
and McCauley’s model of mechanisms of radicalization have taken inspiration from 
psychological analyses (Borum, 2011: 21). An important aspect of the latter research is the 
notion of “grievances”, which denotes psychological mechanisms that drives the radicalization 
process. Individuals and groups develop different types of grievances (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008).  
Interesting mechanisms to investigate in this particular thesis are primarily those between 
groups/counter-groups and movements/counter-movements. First, the most relevant types of 
grievances are tied to inter-group dynamics. McCauley & Moskalenko argue that conflict 
between groups often lead to hate, which in turn can develop into a dehumanization of the 
antagonist party. Hate is a dangerous grievance because it can result in impulsive attacks against 
a counterpart (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 427-428). Smaller (competitive) group-
interactions can also lead to a further intra-group radicalization. Outgroup threats strengthen in-
group cohesion, identification, nationalism or norms (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 426). 
An interesting point is that by analyzing inter-group interactions, we can also observe how it 
interplays with in-group/individual grievances.  
 
2.3.2. Social Movement Theory 
Among social sciences, the study of inter-group radicalization has been especially significant 
in Social Movement Theory. SMT treats the relation between individuals, groups and state 
actors. The transmission of grievances takes place in social networks, which are functions of 
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specific political or social conditions (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 17-19). In essence, three 
features define social movements. First, they are engaged in conflictual collective actions with 
opposed actors. Second, interactions happen in dense informal networks: hence, a mix of 
individual and organized actors. Third, social movements thrive when collective identities 
develop. Connectedness facilitates the potential for a stronger mobilization (Della Porta & 
Diani, 2006: 19-22).  
Some conceptual clarifications are necessary. A movement is different from a group because 
movements diffuse the ideological ground pillar that generally resides within most subgroups 
affiliated to it. They are constituted of informal interactions, but behavior is collective (Diani, 
1992: 7). Groups do not need to be defined with social traits, but identities form based on shared 
orientations, values, worldviews and lifestyles (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 91-92). Different 
forms of beliefs can occur and develop within nations, but the diffusion of radical ideas is also 
as a transnational phenomenon. Groups differ because intra-group processes and specific 
environmental conditions are mixed with a core ideological component that stems from the 
movement, creating varying interpretations of ideological narrative.  
Within Social Movement Theory, we find empirical evidence of inter-group conflicts and 
dynamics. “[…] Social movement theories in particular can contribute a great deal to 
strengthening any theoretical and conceptual apparatus used to analyze terrorism and political 
violence” (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 886-887). McCauley and Moskalenko’s mapping of 
mechanisms of radicalization through group interactions is largely due to the work of scholars 
like Donatella Della Porta, who connects SMT concepts to violent radicalism in her study of 
numerous European militant groups (Borum, 2011: 18).  
Additionally, Social Movement Theory gives the narrative an influential role in the 
indoctrination process; specific arguments made by radical movements reflect the dominating 
grievances that trigger their affiliated groups (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 18). Still, violence 
remains a core element of SMT, interactions between individuals, groups and states have 
previously resulted in mutual escalations of violence (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 17-19). 
Sageman also emphasizes the importance of horizontal networks and social bonds for the 
radicalization process (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 804). Stemming from the escalating progress, 
tiny factions of the original protest group go underground as terrorist cells (Crossett & 




2.4. The concept: Cumulative Extremism 
The concept known as “Cumulative Extremism” (CE) appeared with Roger Eatwell in 2006. 
His pessimism about the future of peaceful multiculturalism in Britain stemmed from the 
growth of several radical political groups. On one side, the English Defense League represented 
a rather anti-Islamic and nationalist ideology. On the other, British Islamic fundamentalist 
groups rose in strength and numbers. Eatwell observed an increase of violent attacks since 2001, 
which might be partly explained by a stronger “community tension” (Eatwell, 2006: 204-205). 
To explain the rise of ethnic extremism, Eatwell points to ten changing societal factors and their 
influenced on a weakening British community cohesion. The analysis suggests a mix between 
internal and external influences. Internal influence may come from increased immigration on 
British soil, relative deprivation of alienated groups or social separation through a visible 
segregation of certain social groups. Among several external factors, he mentions the diffusion 
of information through the Internet and the power of symbolic events. These factors increase 
the risk of violence between radical groups by diminishing community cohesion, also 
understood as polarization (Eatwell, 2006: 205-214).  
After witnessing violent protests in 2006 of Muslim protesters against the Danish-made 
Muhammed cartoons, parts of the media evoked Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” 
as a new upcoming reality (Eatwell, 2006: 213). Eatwell’s analysis highlights a societal 
problem, but ultimately views it as far less (potentially) destructive than parts of the western 
media. However, the scholar appealed to the need to study the interaction between different 
forms of radicalism: 
“A more general pattern is one of extremist animosities fueling each other rather than fraternization 
and understanding” (Eatwell, 2006: 213).  
Some radical groups can provoke antagonist group into adopting violent means. The author 
argues that especially radical-right actors try to shape their “eurabian” thesis trough physical 
clashes with ethnic minorities (Eatwell, 2006: 213-215). Observations indicate that political 
representatives of bigger moderate Muslim masses, as the Islamic council of Europe, somewhat 
discourage integration in western nations. They have also expressed their wish for formations 
of Muslim gatherings in some geographic areas, in attempt to conserve a “Muslim culture” 
(Eatwell, 2006: 214).  
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In essence, Roger Eatwell’s argument has two components. First, radical groups in society have 
dualistic views of the world. They are themselves part of a “good side” and their opponents are 
generally another culturally distinguishable part of society, often homogenously generalized 
into a bigger movement of cultures and beliefs. The radical right and European Islamist 
movements have reached a symbiotic state: the actions of one side towards a specific 
ideological goal will automatically reinforce the worldview of its counter-movement. 
Therefore, the potential for a phenomenon of ideological symbiosis is increasing (Eatwell, 
2006).    
The second component states that a cultural polarization of society could eventually increase 
the level of violence between radical groups, at the cost of normal political pathways (Eatwell, 
2006: 215). Eatwell states that community tension could lead to spirals of violence, thus 
escalating hostilities between opposing radical groups. In fact, this potential security threat got 
quickly incorporated into British national policy based off available empirical evidence and 
events post-2006 (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 885).  
Eatwell’s concept plays out in two different timeframes. First, the development of narrative and 
other deeper ideological processes are latent and gradual. Busher and Maklin characterizes this 
as a long-wavelength process. Movement and counter-movements interact, producing 
interpretive frames and grievances towards each other. However, regarding structural 
explanations, Eatwell believes that any escalation of violence happens in a spiraling process, 
without specifying when, how long, or from whom escalation or de-escalation occurs (Busher 
& Maklin, 2015: 891-892).  
TELL MAMA’s annual report from 2015 mentions an increase in violence, but in forms of 
spikes that lasted shortly following the attack. In many cases, they were directed towards 
civilians or infrastructure with religious/political significance. The phenomenon of short-lasting 
spikes of violence has been observed in several countries, often after terrorist attacks that have 
gotten significant international resonance (Littler & Feldman, 2015; Fry, 2016: 122).  
 
2.5. Understanding Cumulative Extremism through Social Movement Theory 
Social Movement Theory (SMT) brings a supplementary framework of analysis that should be 
included to the concept of Cumulative Extremism for a broader understanding of the 
phenomenon through important structures of political opportunity. While the (contextually 
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isolated) concept of CE (acronym for Cumulative Extremism)  pinpoints to how we can observe 
manifestations of the phenomenon, SMT supplements the theory with a structural explanation 
of why or why not inter-group dynamics actually occur in a more general context. A social 
movement is a set of ideas that spread through society via loose networks (Nawaz, 2011: 4). 
Busher and Maklin argue that Cumulative Extremism is a form of what social movement 
theorists call “Competitive Escalation” (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 887).  
The process of Competitive Escalations stems from the research of Donatella Della Porta. First, 
her academic contributions have given the subfield of radicalization valuable empirical data. 
Significant amounts of observations regarding Italian and German group dynamics sheds light 
on the inter-group competition on a larger European scale (Della Porta, 2013; Bosi et al, 2014). 
Second, empirical data enabled Della Porta to map multi-level causes for the various forms of 
competitive escalations. In “Clandestine Political Activism” (2013), she presents three sets of 
environmental conditions: Structural (root) causes, facilitator (dynamic) causes, and 
precipitating (contingent) events (Della Porta, 2013: 71).  
Preconditions is another expression for “root causes”, or contextual opportunities that could 
facilitate or harden certain forms of behavior. In “The Trouble with Radicalization” (2010), 
Sedgwick notes that the discussion about root causes of radicalization has been significantly 
de-emphasized after 9/11 (Sedgwick, 2010: 480-481). Some highlight the role of economic 
factors, although the statement lacks consistent evidence. Others point to rapid modernization 
and urbanization as a cause for violence (Della Porta, 2013: 72), something which applies 
especially to the radical-right. Modernization can have direct effects on social preconditions 
like the search for identity, which is also a cultural factor (IBID).  
If actors are to accept extreme forms of discourse and violence, Della Porta suggests that an 
additional explanation comes from facilitator causes, such as grievances (Della Porta, 2013: 
71-72). McCauley and Moskalenko incorporate grievances in their models of radicalization, at 
the individual level as well as the group-level. Collective responses to outgroup threats can in 
a group-context lead to hardened collective identification, patriotism or nationalism. In essence, 
a clear ideological hostility is a central factor for the occurrence of any inter-group conflict. 
This point is quite interesting for the notion of mutual “fueling” which follows the concept of 
Cumulative Extremism (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 426-427).  
In small groups, grievances over isolation and threat of perceived enemies can create extreme 
group cohesions and interdependence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 423-424). In-group 
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leaders get increased respect, increasing sanctions against group deviates occurs, and in-group 
norms are strengthened (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 426). Prolonged conflicts between 
groups can also result in dehumanization or hate towards a perceived opponent, which augments 
the risk of impulsive attacks (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 426-428). These emotive 
intensifications after outgroup interactions are important in a process of Cumulative Extremism.  
Lastly, Della Porta mentions the importance of precipitating events, which could act as triggers 
for violent reactions from radical groups (Della porta, 2013: 71). Bartlett and Birdwell came to 
similar conclusions in their analysis; the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013 was crucial in the 
escalation of conflicts between radical Islamists and the EDL in Britain (Bartlett & Birdwell, 
2013). National events can also become international injustice symbols, like the Muhammad 
caricatures that the Danish journal Jyllandsposten published in 2005. The events of 9/11, the 
conflict in Palestine and the 03’ Iraq war did certainly have similar effects. While many 
moderate Muslims in different countries did react to this phenomenon, only a few individuals 
actually mobilized with violent goals (Bosi et al, 2016: 217-232). This shows how particular 
episodes can have problematic consequences as they gain international resonance.  
These three categories of variables are all important when explaining the larger dynamics of 
radicalization. Unfortunately, analyzing them all would be too extensive for this thesis. 
However, looking at one of the three could give significant explanatory power to the process of 
Cumulative Extremism in specific national contexts. In this dissertation, the focus lies on 
structural causes, which can act as facilitating or limiting conditions for processes of Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization. These indicate the radical groups’ scope of opportunity and their 
strategies, in many ways societal limits or freedoms in political contexts.  
Different categories of factors highlight general tendencies of group interactions, but their 
individual strength could be context-dependent. For example, community polarization could be 
the main driver for CE in Britain, but other countries may observe other structural conditions 
to be more important (Brockett, 1991: 253). The body of theory and recent findings makes it 
possible to isolate key conditions of great importance for inter-group radicalization. These will 
figure after the presentation of the new conceptual changes of CE.  
 
2.6. Cumulative Extremism: conceptual disagreement  
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Since 2006, the concept of “Cumulative Extremism” has been subject to increased amounts of 
academic attention. In the British context, we find a number of analysis related to mechanisms 
of inter-group radicalization (Eatwell, 2006; Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013), this is also the case 
for Italy, Germany, Northern Ireland (Della Porta, 2013; Bosi et al, 2014) and Norway (Bjørgo 
et al 2001; Bjørgo 2005). Although some have analyzed radicalization in an inter-group context, 
the subject is in itself still quite recent. Naturally, there is still a lack of consensus at the 
conceptual level. Academics have criticized Cumulative Extremism in recent years, and for 
several reasons.  
 
2.6.1. How wording may affect the concept  
Existing research establishes that radical inter-group interactions can occur indirectly, directly, 
at the narrative level, and through violence of different forms and degrees. There has been a 
growing interest in the subject; but some scholars warn that the need for caution is increasing 
(Maklin & Busher, 2015: 53-54). A few discuss that the concept of CE could itself need changes 
(Busher & Maklin, 2014), which will figure later in this thesis. A first step is to illustrate one 
smaller problem that remains unsolved: scholars’ choice of actual words to describe the dyadic 
dynamic.  
Cumulative Extremism (Eatwell, 2006), “Tit for tat” Extremism (Mughal. 2014; Kundnani, 
2012), Reciprocal Radicalization (Cole & Pantucci, 2014), Reactive Group-Radicalization 
(Fry, 2016). These are some of the description used by different scholars for the study of a 
similar phenomenon (Maklin and Busher, 2015). There is no doubt that the subfield of inter-
group radicalization could certainly benefit from homogenous characterizations. As Maklin and 
Busher argue, it is quite problematic that the concept has multiple depictions (Busher & Maklin, 
2014: 885). 
First, Extremism and Radicalization is certainly not the same thing, there has been a wrongful 
equating of the two notions. Alex P. Schmid argues this point by showing that the concept of 
Extremism is, in itself, flawed. The contradiction arrives when one tries to differentiate “non-
violent” and “violent extremism” from one another. What is non-violent extremism? According 
to Schmid, this notion is non-existent. Radicals, on the other hand, have empirically been 
known to be both. Extremists do not accept democratic solutions, based on their inflexible 
mono-causal interpretations of the world; you are either with them or against them. Radicals do 
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not reject most democratic values, and could be potential allies in counter-terrorism (Schmid, 
2014: 7-11).   
“Radicals then are not per se violent and while they might share certain characteristics (e.g. alienation from the 
state, anger over a country’s foreign policy, feelings of discrimination) with (violent) extremists, there are also 
important differences (such as regarding the willingness to engage in critical thinking). It does not follow that a 
radical attitude must result in violent behavior – a finding well established by decades of research” (Schmid, 
2014: 8).  
What Schmid demonstrates is that scholars who want to measure the same thing, actually 
renders their task extremely complicated. Comparing results would ultimately be unproductive. 
Are we measuring violent actions, a wider non-violent community polarization, or maybe both? 
(Maklin & Busher, 2014: 54). The choice of the word “Extremism” could force academics to 
analyze violent actions, which is unproblematic if that is the ultimate goal but dubious if non-
violence and the narrative do have a certain importance in the research.  
The second point is that the supporting component of the concept comes in many different 
varieties. For instance, the words “cumulative” and “reciprocal” have quite different meanings. 
While cumulative could very well be associated with escalating violence, it says nothing on the 
mutuality of the phenomenon. Establishing reciprocity will on the other hand tell us nothing 
about an eventual shift from non-violent strategies towards violent tactics (Maklin & Busher, 
2014: 54). This also applies to labels like “Tit for tat” or “Reactive”. To increase measurement 
efficiency, we need to inject more (and identical) descriptive words into the concept. For 
example, if we chose to measure inter-group dynamics through the concept of “Reciprocal 
Radicalization”, we find that it is also the description of a concept of intra-group radicalization 
in WW2 Germany (Mommsen, 1997: 2). Establishing the dynamics in play as vertical or 
horizontal then becomes necessary. 
 
2.7. Cumulative Extremism - Pathways of influence: 
2.7.1. Non-violent interactions  
[…] Normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging 
interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in 
confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. (Schmid, 2013) 
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Although behavior is non-violent, the classification also contains radical actions. The definition 
above is quite important; the condition of “growing confrontational tactics” implies a move 
towards illegal methods of interaction. As we have seen, the classification of non-violent 
interactions between radical groups can happen on-line and off-line. Much like violent means, 
non-violence can be targeted both at radicals (direct contact) affiliated to groups or movements 
as well as civilians (indirect contact) (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 892).   
Indirect interactions between radical groups can happen online. For example, after Woolwich, 
the EDL saw a significant increase of its online support (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 4-5). This 
is manifested by changes of narratives, towards a more radical discourse of the counter-
movement. A general trend already shows this with the new central ideological components of 
the two movements: counter-Jihadism and the strategy of global Jihad.  
Especially within the radical right, the ideological radicalization process in the last decades has 
alienated several European Muslim communities. This ideological development is not 
necessarily bound to any precipitating event. By investigating websites, we might observe the 
increased commitment of confrontational tactics against “Muslims” but also “Western” 
citizens, dependent on the radical groups in question. Incidents online of an indirect nature 
could manifest in verbal abuse against common citizens on the “enemy side”. Social media such 
as Facebook and other interactive websites should have a central role in this process (Sabha et 
al, 2015: 5).  
Off-line non-violence is quite similar to online-actions, but differs because confrontations are 
between individuals in person. These incidents are illegal because dialog takes the form of 
religious/racial hatred or threats (Tell MAMA, 2015: 13). As defined by Schmid, direct non-
violent confrontation between group members is mostly about pressure and coercion. Increased 
inter-group intimidation, threats or abusive language should be indications of a non-violent 
radicalization process. In contrast to the everyday citizen, it is improbable that radicals would 
contact the police to report incidents against them. Interviews with these individuals could be 
more fruitful than to rely on police reports. Not all incidents against victims of hate crimes are 
reported as well; some argue that this is because some social groups display a higher level of 
mistrust against institutions of law enforcement (Pezella, 2017: 10-11).  
Reports point to a general increase in off-line incidents after 9/11. Vandalism against mosques 
has apparently become a transnational trend (Stormark & Strømmen, 2015: 13-14). These are 
in most cases initiated by radical-right individuals or groups, and emphasize the counter-jihadi 
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ideological component that has been developing the last decade or so. “Pork attacks” have 
occurred in Norway, where bacon and other forms of pig meat have been placed right outside 
a mosque in Kristiansand. The perpetrators were active members or the radical-right group 
SIAN (Stop Islamiseringen av Norge). Since then, Norwegian mosques experienced four 
episodes (2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013) of similar nature. This phenomenon has also occurred 
in other countries in Europe like France, Sweden or Germany (Stormark & Strømmen, 2015: 
27-29).   
 
2.7.2. Violent interactions 
Following Roger Eatwell’s initial analysis of the phenomenon of CE in the British context, 
several incidents have occurred that made facilitated scholars’ research of inter-group 
mechanisms and radicalization. Bartlett and Birdwell suggest that there is a “clear intuitive case 
for this phenomenon”. They perceive the creation of the English Defense League as a response 
to the activities of al-Mujahiroun in Royal Wootton Bassett (UK). Since then, both groups’ 
intentions of provoking their antagonist became apparent, sometimes in forms of direct violent 
behavior (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 4). Violent interactions can occur both in direct and 
indirect nature. In contrast to direct confrontation, an indirect form of violence does not focus 
on interactions between two radical groups, but on radicalism against civilians.  
A small fraction of British citizens with radical Islamic beliefs admitted multiple attempts to 
plot attacks on EDL members in May 2013. Later the same month, a former leader of an EDL 
counter-rally murdered British army soldier Lee Rigby in the famous “Woolwich attack”. 
Anjem Chouadry then announced the creation of an EDL-type group, the Islamic Defense 
League, a month later. This continuation of violent and sporadic reprisals eventually forced the 
British Prime minister to establish a new taskforce on radicalization (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 
4-5). These events show that inter-group interactions can manifest in direct confrontations 
between the involved parties. However, the radical groups are not always the ones targeted.  
For Mughal, the threat of the radical-right movement and its subgroups should be taken as 
seriously as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. The EDL facilitates the “simple man’s” negative perception of 
a Muslim citizen. If this hostility becomes a mainstream notion, it can result in increased abuse 
from EDL recruits and sympathizers. In fact, Mughals national Islamophobia-project “TELL 
MAMA” found evidence of increased violence and abuse against common Muslim in 2012/13 
(Copsey et al, 2013) and 2013/2014 (Littler & Feldman, 2014). Post-Woolwich, the EDL saw 
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a significant increase of hate crimes directed towards civilians and mosques (Bartlett & 
Birdwell, 2013: 4-5). These sorts of actions unite under the classification of political violence 
(Schmid, 2013: 13-15), but are strategically indirectly aimed at another radical group.  
Events in different countries have demonstrated that Eatwell’s prediction of conflict escalations 
through spirals remains unclear, despite Woolwich and its connected episodes. Regarding 
violent confrontational tactics, it is far from obvious that we should expect an escalation of this 
kind of behavior. Instead, the emerging tendency shows a clustering of interactions around a 
key event (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 891; Maklin and Busher, 2015: 57-59). Structural 
opportunities are important; targeting civilians is the easiest strategy if inter-group interaction 
is difficult. However, the thesis argues that consistent inter-group contact beyond spikes would, 
in most cases, remain unreported and “under the radar”.   
 
2.8. Cumulative Extremism revised 
With the help of proposals from several scholars and CE literature, this thesis seeks to develop 
a revised concept of Cumulative Extremism can be operationalized in different inter-group 
contexts. Hopefully, mapping the scope of interactive arenas contributes to further transnational 
research and coordination in the subfield. If we are to explore more cases of this specific 
phenomenon, it is important that we propose a proper general conceptualization.  
 
2.8.1. What should we call the phenomenon? 
As argue earlier in the thesis, describing the inter-group radicalization process as “Cumulative 
Extremism” is problematic. Extremism overlooks the radicalization power of ideas, narrative 
and ideology. However, radicalization extends our interpretation of the process and 
incorporates non-violence as an important component. Radicalization also has a second 
function: it describes a cumulative or gradual process. In Schmid’s definition, he describes it as 
a “growing commitment” (Schmid, 2013: 18).  
The problem with a cumulative process is that it implies spiraling notion or successive 
additions. What about asymmetrical spikes of violence? A growing commitment could latently 
form in ideology and later burst out in a single spike. No acts of reprisal are necessary; the 
process could stop at this point. During clashes between the British National Party and AFA in 
the 1990s, BNP innovated tactically away from violence: something that can be defined as 
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“cumulative de-radicalization” (Maklin & Busher, 2014: 59). How could we then measure an 
ideological accumulation? Based on the previous argument, we need to replace “cumulative”. 
Describing CE simply as a dynamic of radicalization seems logical. It leaves open the 
possibility of either spikes or spirals of reciprocal violence.  
Stating that the process is one of radicalization says nothing about the direction of it. As 
demonstrated, vertical radicalization is an intra-group process. Any inter-group process is one 
of horizontal nature, and this should figure in the description for conceptual distinctiveness. A 
horizontal process implies the specific direction of the process, but remains inclusive so that 
both spikes and spirals is possible. This inclusiveness is important because varying contexts 
will determine how the dynamic manifests itself. Inter-group dynamics can lead to a 
radicalization of narrative, but it may as well stop right there. In other words, no increase in 
visible violence or even certain forms of non-violence are central for this specific process to 
occur.  
Another important aspect is to establish reciprocity. A problem that the thesis discussed earlier 
regards the asymmetrical relationship and the ideological perception of the enemy. An 
asymmetrical ideological relationship between two radical factions would probably not cause 
sustained inter-group conflicts. A mutual link is necessary to establish reciprocity: the fueling 
goes in both directions. Hence, we end up with a new description: Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization. This concept includes radical non-violent acts as an important indicator, as well 
political violence and terrorism as outcomes of HRR. In the long run, we end up with the 
intensification of one end-state as well as a move towards other forms as tactical innovations.  
 
2.8.2. Description  
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization process is defined by a gradual increase of radicalism 
towards an ideological goal, as groups are in conflict with one another. It is a two-way process, 
defined by a dynamic of reciprocal tactical innovation to surpass the enemy (Della Porta, 2012: 
246). When we arrive at this stage, the most current form of radicalism used by groups is 
political violence. In her research on political violence and radicalization, Della Porta finds that 
political violence depend on two things: political opportunities that trigger violence, and the 
presence of an ideology that justifies violence (Della Porta, 2012: 248). Political opportunity 
structures enable the legitimation of the violent ideological component.  
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Although this thesis focuses on the causal effects of three specific independent variables, 
alternative explanations can also be quite interesting for a further conceptual development. 
Reports from TELL MAMA or Hate Speech International show that sporadic increases of hate 
crimes against Muslims are often triggered by terrorist attacks, demonstrations and others forms 
of symbolic events that might trigger responsive behavior from an outgroup (Stormark & 
Strømmen, 2015: 13). This applies primarily to indirect strategies of interaction. The scale of 
violent and non-violent radicalization intensifies with facilitator causes: the psychological 
effects of the contact. Direct or indirect interactions with an outgroup cause intra-group 
radicalization, which then again drives outgroup radicalization if further direct/indirect 
confrontations of radical nature take place.   
 
2.8.3. Observing Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization: three possible outcomes  
There are three specific manifestations of the process of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. 
Alex Schmid defines radicalization as a shift from peaceful political strategies towards (radical) 
non-violence, violence or terrorism (Schmid, 2013). The three indicators function by the 
family resemblance, where one of the alternatives is sufficient to enlighten the process (Goertz, 
2006: 36-37). Indicators of radicalization are recognized as individual end-states, but it is 
evident that displays of radicalization trough exclusively non-violence would not be considered 
as a major problem in the same extent as situations where factions employ tactics of political 
violence or terrorism.   
Radicalization feeds on an ideological basis. First, we often find ideology to be a cover for 
pathological backgrounds in cases of “loners”. There are rare cases of non-ideological mass-
murders like or German Wings pilot Andreas Lubitz (Merelli, 2015); however, they do 
represent only a minority of the cases of perpetrator. We can thus assume that in most cases, 
ideology drives different forms of actions (Pantucci, 2011:14-19). Secondly, ideological 
camouflage is also problematic when we consider that some radical Islamists may profess 
“taqiyya”, which is the notion hiding religious intentions under certain circumstances. 
Therefore, if radical groups interact by using violent means, we could most likely observe a 
preexisting narrative or tendencies of radical non-violence that advocates an amplified use of 
violence.  
Alex Schmid presents non-violent radicalism as the first end-state of radicalization (Schmid, 
2013: 18), which manifests through direct or indirect contact. Direct interactions take place 
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between group members, while indirect interactions are asymmetrical: between radical group 
members and civilians. The strategy behind indirect interactions is to provoke the counterpart, 
or aiming at producing reactionary behavior from outgroups. Arenas for radical non-violence 
are both on-line and off-line; pressure and coercion is not bound to any physical contact but 
might as well happen on social network, by telephone or email. A move from indirect tactics 
towards direct physical confrontations indicates increased competitiveness and hostility of 
group-strategies. Social Movement Theory states that this is facilitating for “competitive 
escalation”, hence there is a bigger chance that we might see a move from one indicator of 
Schmid’s definition to another (Della Porta, 2013: 71-72).’ 
It is important to clarify that a cumulative innovation towards political violence is not necessary, 
and in some cases improbable. The amount of non-violence through pressure and coercion can 
increase, but the use of violent ends such as political violence or terrorism in an inter-group 
conflict might be strategically and practically impossible for radicals due to certain structural 
constraints. Nevertheless, if inter-group conflict sustains over longer periods, it would be 
unlikely that escalation remained within the non-violent spectrum of radicalism.  
Alex Schmid states that we measure non-violent radicalism through increased pressure and 
coercion. Increased appeals towards violent means in narrative indicates a growing ideological 
confrontational tactic. Ideological narrative moves towards the opposite of what Schmid 
denotes as “democratic”: tolerance and compromise (Schmid, 2013: 18). Different forms of 
hate speeches correspond to this description, like threats, defamations and discriminations 
based on group-belongings (Sunde, 2013: 35). In non-verbal forms, vandalism against symbolic 
infrastructures is also an indicator of the horizontal process of radicalization, as long as these 
actions have their basis in ideology. As we shall see in the next section, this turns out to be quite 
problematic in practice.  
The second observable outcome is political violence. Like non-violence, it can occur either 
indirectly (radical-civilian) or directly (radical-radical). An increase in indirect interactions 
should be observable through increases in hate crimes, ideologically responsive to the activity 
of counter-groups. Increased physical confrontations between radicals themselves do also 
indicate the process, as long as these are ideologically motivated confrontations.  
Scholars have observed indirect non-violence and political violence in forms of spikes after 
precipitating events. For instance, the French political expert Jean-Yves Camus warned about 
radical-right violence against the French Muslims population, primarily in response to the 
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various terrorist attacks in the country (Albertini, 2016). Direct confrontational tactics are 
sometimes harder to detect, under the radar or not necessarily reported. Nevertheless, as long 
as groups do not directly take credit for accidents, indirect tactics distort indications of their 
general behavior. We do not always know if aggressors have particular affiliations to groups 
with radical ideologies in reported hate crimes. The aftermath of the murder of Theo Van Gogh 
in the Netherlands (2004) illustrates this point, where only 10% of many hundreds incidents of 
political violence were linked to known groups (Taylor et al, 2013: 116-117).  
The last observable outcome is terrorism. A terrorist attack is a possible end-state of the 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization-process. This thesis treats terrorism as an end-state that 
might have its basis in the diffusion of narrative as much as by prolonged violent inter-group 
actions. Terrorism in dyadic contexts is ultimately unlikely as a tactical tool in conflicts unless 
we observe a growing commitment for the reciprocal use of at least one of the two other forms 
of radicalism before it.  
 
2.8.4. Indirect strategies and Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization  
When it comes to measurability, indirect tactics of interaction is a challenge. The main actors 
in the relevant dynamic are radical groups. Let us say that an annual anti-Muslim racism report 
shows that an X number of civilians have been victims of hate crimes or racist slurs right after 
precipitating events. Are all the assailants radicals, or just some of them? Is an individual per 
definition radical after one perpetration, or can it be a case of an “emotive outburst”? These 
questions are impossible to quantify in precise estimates, because ideologically moderate 
individuals can also have powerful emotional responses to symbolic events as well as normal 
circumstances.  
Nonetheless, indirect strategies are incorporated in the overall concept of reciprocal inter-group 
radicalization. As scholars have discussed (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013), in many cases radical 
groups uses them to fuel grievances in a counter-group/movement as well as reactive behavior. 
In some instances, the ideological goal is an escalation of inter-group conflicts, which 
legitimates and reinforces their worldview. However, the problem is that we cannot be certain 
of: a) an aggressor’s possible group belonging and b) the tactical/ideological goal behind the 
crime. Thus, maintaining direct strategies amongst radical groups reflects not just a state of 
mutual tension between two vague oppositions, but enables us to observe interactions between 
specific ideological opponents. It removes the risk of creating too many false positives (Busher 
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& Maklin, 2015: 886), which is probable if we chose to analyze indirect actions without any 
further conceptual changes. 
This thesis choses to incorporate radicalism against non-radical targets in the concept because 
observations show that this is a specific tactical tool practiced by radical groups, which 
eventually leads to provocation of enemy groups and in some cases reprisals. A possible 
explanation to similarities between radical and “non-radical” responses is that the ideological 
component presented by radicals, especially the radical right, has been popularized by populist 
parties and vice versa (Betz, 1993: 415; Strømmen, 2011: 149).  
Radicals and common citizens share similar opinions, grievances and emotive responses. This 
creates a measurement blur of the indirect aspect of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. 
Muslims in the UK now face a dual threat: political violence committed by a small number of 
radical nationalists as well as unaffiliated individuals and gangs (Taylor et al, 2013: 55). Further 
analysis will have its basis in direct radicalism between radical groups, either in non-violent or 
violent forms.  
Third party actors and structural conditions explain how the context determines inter-group 
interactions. The discussion so far has tried to establish the end-states of the phenomenon, 
because there has been a need for conceptual clarification. However, this answers the “if”. 
Presenting and analyzing political opportunity structures lets us answer the “why”.  In Norway, 
this question becomes especially interesting. In the 1990s, clashes between neo-Nazi- and anti-
racist groups indicate processes of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization (Bjørgo et al, 2001; 
Bjørgo, 2005). Similar dynamics have been observed between radical Islamists and counter-
jihadists in Britain. Nevertheless, no (direct) interactions in either end-state of Schmid’s 
radicalization were observed between their “sister groups” in Norway. What can explain this? 
The next sections presents three independent variables that theory pinpoints as drivers for 
processes of inter-group radicalization.   
 
2.9. Independent variables  
Social Movement Theory does not present any specific framework of variables to explain any 
occurrence of competitive (inter-group) escalation. In SMT, several theorists have used the term 
“political opportunity structures”, where the basic idea is that external factors facilitate 
mobilization when they come in certain manifestations: “Analysts therefore appropriately 
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direct much of their attention to the world outside a social movement, on the premise that 
exogenous factors enhance or inhibit a social movement’s prospects” (Meyer, 2004: 126).  
However, Donatella Della Porta discovers a crucial aspect of radicalization, political violence 
and competitive escalation. She highlights the importance of interactions between mechanisms 
of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization: 
“A lack of narrowing of opportunities alone is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for 
sustained waves of political violence”. Mechanisms that cause radicalization are activated by 
interactions between movement activists and their opponents […]” (Della Porta, 2012: 246). 
What Della Porta argues is that cases of HRR require a mix of structural facilitators and 
systematic contact between different fractions to spark conflict and sustain it over longer 
periods in time. Sporadic contact then logically limits the possibility for reciprocal tactical 
innovations; processes of reciprocal radicalization cease in cases where limiting factors hinder 
group interaction. We should then expect variables to have very different manifestations across 
inter-group cases with dissimilar outcomes.  
Networks in which social movements and their subgroups operate within are quite complex. 
For instance, there are different levels of analysis in the studies of political violence and 
terrorism. While terrorism studies focus on micro-level psychological explanations, social 
movement studies have often examined macro-level variables such as the effects of economic 
development and modernization. Della Porta argues that these interpretations lack meso-level 
variables, an analytical level that captures both dynamics and interactions in the organizational 
field (Della Porta, 2012: 246).  
Three explanatory variables have been selected from a mix of findings in Social Movement 
Theory, the sub-field of Competitive Escalation and in the concept of Cumulative Extremism. 
The independent variables are ideology, counter-radicalization and competition. These 
variables create conditions for inter-group radicalization, and are located within the meso-level 
of analysis due to the group-perspective of the analysis. Nevertheless, the thesis encourages 
supplementary variables in if they can contribute to a better theorization of HRR and the 
understanding of similar cases in other contexts. A complex qualitative mapping of intra-group 
structures and dynamics through micro-level analysis (individuals) could be an example of this 





After the initial discussion of the concept of “Cumulative Extremism” by Roger Eatwell, 
Bartlett and Birdwell decided to test four assumptions made by the originator. One of Eatwell’s 
assumptions argues for a symbiotic relationship between the radical right and the radical Islamic 
movement in Britain, which eventually has a magnifying effect on the general processes of 
radicalization (Eatwell, 2006: 213-214). They found the activities of radical Islamic groups to 
have significant effects on the radical right, but the strength of the opposite effect is assumed 
unclear (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 9-10).  
Some argue for the idea of an ideological interdependence. Majid Nawaz illustrates that general 
recruitment is (mutually) facilitated by propaganda (Nawaz, 2012: 1-2). Stormark and 
Strømmen arrive at similar conclusions; the activities of the radical right can fuel jihadi 
recruitment (Stormark & Strømmen, 2015: 5). Certain inter-group perceptions have great 
importance in HRR dynamics. What these findings highlight is a certain reciprocal influence, 
but establishing firm conclusions of an ideological symbiosis requires us to look deeper into 
the most central “drivers”.  
On the subject of political violence, which is one of the three end-states in the concept of 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, Della porta introduces the notion of “discursive 
opportunity”. After examining student movements in Italy and Germany in the 1960s, the 
scholar found that violence and repression was justified by the specific ideology of the state. 
Hence, certain components of narrative can accepts or advocates radicalism. This can also apply 
to Schmid’s definition of radicalization, which contains radical non-violence and terrorism. 
Ideology thus becomes the first independent variable to examine. However, Della Porta argues 
that the mere presence of discursive opportunities does not trigger radicalization (Della Porta, 
2012: 247-248). The variable is thus not a sufficient condition, but as we see empirical findings 
highlights it as necessary for a HRR-process.  
 
2.9.2. Counter-radicalization: 
Coercive policies have minimizing effects on radicalization, especially on radical activities and 
inter-group contact (Maklin & Busher, 2015: 63-64). In his initial theory of Cumulative 
Extremism, Roger Eatwell argues that competitive confrontations between radical groups is 
facilitated by certain conditions in society (Eatwell, 2006). On the other hand, structural factors 
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can also work as limiting for mechanisms of radicalization. In the radicalization field, such 
disengaging factors are labeled “push-factors” and “pull-factors” (Barrelle, 2010: 11).  
The author has chosen to use counter-radicalization as an extensive independent variable. 
Scholars argue that counter-radicalization is a “catch-all” denomination that incorporates three 
types of measures, each influencing distinct moments in the radicalization process (Clutterbuck, 
undated); ISCR: 2012, 9). The three types of initiatives that constitute counter-radicalization 
measures are prevention, disengagement and de-radicalization. Prevention blocks radicalization 
from taking hold in the first place, disengagement initiatives aim to take the individual out from 
their radical environment without necessarily focusing on eliminating the ideological basis, and 
de-radicalization seeks to eliminate the radical ideas an individual might hold (ISCR, 2012: 8-
10).  
Given Schmid’s definition of radicalization, counter-radicalization is understood as the 
prevention of either manifestation of radicalism: non-violence, political violence or terrorism 
(Schmid, 2013). The conceptual inclusiveness of the variable signifies that we have to narrow 
down measures that might have had a significant impact on the group’s activities and structure. 
The second case in this analysis is a deviant case of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, 
which means that the groups never reached a point of reciprocal tactical innovation where they 
used increasing forms for radicalism. Therefore, the thesis analyzes this variable by the 
unilateral effect of initiatives, to find out why Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence league 
did not achieve HRR by reciprocal tactical innovations of radicalism.  
Scholars like Della Porta (Della Porta, 2012), Tore Bjørgo (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009) and 
Wictorowiz have attempted to shed light on opportunity structures that facilitate radicalization. 
Instead of aggrandizing the space of opportunity (facilitator), the variable of counter-
radicalization is most certainly limiting in its effect on the radicalization process, in other words 
a “push-factor”. The more counter-radicalization in society, the more difficult it is for ongoing 
radicalization and reciprocal tactical innovations.  
 
2.9.3. Competition  
In some cases, radical groups compete against each other. This is the third independent variable 
that this thesis seeks to analyze. Competition might revolve around supporters, recruitment, 
resources, publicity, legitimacy, prestige or power. Bjørgo states that competition over scarce 
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resources may be imagined as well as real (Bjørgo, 2011: 283), which means that competitively 
can have an ideational aspect. Inter-group competition might lead to a strengthening of the in-
group cohesion (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-425), thereby augmenting the possibility 
for strong polarization in inter-group conflicts. This can ultimately lead groups to use the three 
end-states of radicalism in the concept of HRR presented in the thesis. 
It is important to highlight that this independent variable isn’t necessarily connected to 
ideology. Even though there might exist competitive components in narrative, competition can 
also exist outside of subjective perceptions. Two groups might develop a state of mutual tension 
if they are in conflict over shared goods, which are ultimately scarce and interesting for both 
parts in order to advance their ideological goal. Historically, different radical groups have 
entered dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. For instance, radical right- and left 
wings have had a long and conflict-filled history (Della Porta, 2012: 243-256).  
More recently, some view parts of the radical right and radical Islamism as two groups with 
conflicting interests. Donatella Della Porta argues that contact is important for mechanisms of 
inter-group radicalization (Della Porta, 2012: 246), the thesis argues that inter-group 
















3.1. Quantitative vs qualitative 
The choice of method in a master thesis is essential because difference types of methodologies 
reflects very distinct approaches to research. We find two dominant approaches: quantitative 
and qualitative studies (Creswell, 2003: 13-14). A quantitative analysis is defined as an 
inference based on large numbers of observations, often translated into statistical datasets. On 
the other hand, the qualitative analysis has basis in few observations, and is especially 
appropriate when we want to analyze causality (Gerring, 2012: 362).  
The qualitative approach relies on limited knowledge about central cases, while a quantitative 
analysis thrives on detailed information (Collier et al, 2003: 5-6). Due to the general lack of 
data on the subject of radicalization, it is appropriate to use a qualitative approach in this thesis. 
This argument is even more relevant for our two specific cases and the HRR concept, there are 
no existent databases available for analysis. Among many methodologies within a qualitative 
analysis, we find the statistical method, the historical method, the case study and the 
comparative method (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).  
This thesis has chosen to conduct a comparative analysis of a positive case of Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization and a deviant case of the same phenomenon in Norway. A 
comparative inquiry involves variables analyses and tries to establish causality. The weight of 
focus is thus slightly more on the latter case than the former, for which there an empirical 
relationship between three variables by means of control. In contrast to an experimental design, 
a comparative analysis controls causals mechanisms in natural contexts. It also selects variables 
by the function of the independent variable, not randomly (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 96). The 
inquiry establishes the causal effect of the independent variables, and shows how their specific 
constitution created different outcomes HRR in the two cases. 
 
3.2. Inductive vs deductive reasoning 
There are two methods of reasoning: deduction and induction. Based off existing theory, the 
deductive approach moves towards specific conclusion based off established definitions and 
assumptions (Zalaghi & Khazaei, 2016: 24). On the other hand, the inductive approach derives 
general conclusions, theories and assumptions from empirical findings. With induction, we 
move from the specific to the general. The thesis finds the deductive approach of inquiry to be 
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the most appropriate because the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization has basis in 
Schmid’s definition of radicalization, (Schmid, 2013) Della Porta’s Competitive Escalation 
(SMT) and Eatwell’s concept of Cumulative Extremism (Della Porta, 2012; Della Porta, 2013; 
Eatwell, 2006).  
As we have seen in the theoretical part, we predict the causal effect of certain factors for 
mechanisms of inter-group radicalization. This enables the thesis to select a set of independent 
variables, which are analyzed in the context of the two cases. The thesis choses a method of 
deductive reasoning, and generates an analytical framework through the convergence of 
findings from different academic contributions. The selection of the independent variables has 
its base in theory as well as empirical data. The comparative analysis then enables us to generate 
context-specific conclusions through the analysis of the independent variables in the two cases 
in the Norwegian context.   
The independent variables have been empirically discovered to have a certain causal effect on 
the process of inter-group radicalization in other contexts. The first step is to test theory and 
causal assumptions tied to the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization and the 
explanatory variables selected. This will ultimately lead to the confirmation or rejection of three 
hypotheses. By contrasting two cases through a comparative analysis, we strengthen the 
conclusions we get from our hypotheses (Zalaghi & Khazaei, 2016: 25).  
An important clarification is that the thesis’ goal is not to generate conclusions that holds a 
general explanation for necessary factors for positive cases of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization. The selection of independent variables is through empirical findings, but any 
conclusion deduced from analysis are specific and may not be found to be applicable to contexts 
other than Norway. For example, one special trait of the Norwegian case in the 90s/2000s is 
that the process of radicalization was unfolding primarily between youth-groups (Bjørgo et al, 
2001). Other countries may experience clashes between radical-right and radical left factions 
with different social backgrounds. However, contrasting a positive case and a deviant case 
through a comparative analysis contributes to develop the content of theory (Emigh, 1997: 657), 
which might extend the context-independent understanding of the phenomenon.  
 
3.3. Case Analysis  
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The theoretical part presents three independent variables. Dependent of their nature, they 
function as either facilitating or limiting structures of political opportunity for Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization. The thesis seeks explanatory information (why) dependent on the 
difference of outcome of the cases selected through political opportunity structures. This 
analytical goal fits a standard of qualitative research. The chosen independent variables remain 
constant in the inquiry of both cases; the thesis argues for the comparative case analysis as the 
most suited methodology.  
Choosing a case study relates to the nature of the central research question. As Yin explains, 
exploratory question like “what” or “how” are often better answered with experimental or 
survey studies (Yin, 2003: 6). On the other hand, this thesis asks why certain opportunity 
structures facilitate or limit Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization across two cases. Here, Yin 
argues that case studies and historical methods are the more suited. The historical method is 
generally appropriate when past records are undiscovered, documents missing and general 
sources of evidence non-existent. Scholars have uncovered and analyzed the first case in detail. 
However, there exists less information about the groups in the contemporary case, especially at 
the inter-group level. Case studies are appropriate when we want to discover new evidence 
about certain circumstances (Yin, 2003: 8), here HRR connected to Profetens Ummah and the 
Norwegian Defence League.  
Two important clarifications are necessary. First, the thesis performs the analysis on two levels. 
The constant in the analysis is the “cases”, which in this thesis figures as a bilateral relation 
between factions with radical ideologies. However, the two cases are constituted of different 
units. In the first period, the conflicts occurred between multiple groups with heterogeneous 
traits. Why is a generalization of multiple identities practical? The thesis analyzes the second 
case as a conflict between two specific group, the NDL and PU. While Profetens Ummah was 
the only active radical Islamist group, there thesis could have chosen to observe the counter-
jihadi side as both the actions of the NDL and SIAN. This leads to the second clarification 
needed, which is why the thesis selects the Norwegian Defence League. Other radical-right 
groups were also simultaneously active in Norway in the same period (2012-2014).  
 
3.3.1. Case 1: Generalization across two factions with heterogeneous sub-groups 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the racist and anti-racist movements were composed of multiple 
subgroups with heterogeneous beliefs on subjects like violence and racism. The thesis has 
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chosen conduct the analysis through a generalization of the two sides, were one faction is 
labeled as neo-Nazi and the other as anti-Racist. Several examples will address some specific 
groups within the movements, but overall, the latter point remains dominating. This is practical 
is two ways:  
First, research on the movements in the first case exists through qualitative methodology. The 
most important academic contributions highlight general tendencies within the movements, and 
do not go further into the relationship between specific subgroups. As Bjørgo states, collective 
characterizations was methodologically suited because of strong binary formations. The social 
groups were dependent of mutual antagonism, and they seemed to constitute on another. There 
was a very clear pattern of conflict (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 25-26).  
Since further observations are impossible due to temporal constraints, the thesis has to use the 
available data to perform the analysis. For example, the thesis cannot discuss the nuances 
between the distinct effects of legislation on the Valla-gang compared to AFA because it would 
require relevant and detailed information about the sub-groups. Ultimately, this has no negative 
impact on the validity of the comparative analysis because it is the effect of the political 
opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization that is necessary to answer the 
research question. Extensive research done by Bjørgo, Carlsson, Fangen and others captures 
these effects with high validity.  
Second, it is very difficult to operationalize the concept of HRR without looking at the 
relationship between two specific factions. For instance, investigation inter-group dynamics 
between three or four actors would require new data and possibly new theories. The thesis has 
therefore chosen to conduct such an analysis because the primary analytical goal is to answer 
why HRR did not occur in the second case. Conclusions on the three generated hypotheses 
about ideology, counter-radicalization measures and competition also increase in validity when 
we render the cases comparable and identifiable.  
 
3.3.2. Why the Norwegian Defence League? 
Profetens Ummah was the first active radical Islamist group in Norway. Therefore, selecting 
PU for the second case is very intuitive. However, the Norwegian Defence League just was one 
of several radical-right groups that were active in the country between 2012 and 2014. For 
instance, Stop Islamiseringen av Norge (SIAN), Den Nordiske Motstandsbevegelsen and Vigrid 
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were also active within the national borders. What makes the NDL more relevant than the other 
radical-right groups?  
First, Nordfront and Vigrid have been labeled as neo-Nazi groups (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 11-
13). The dominating grievance in these groups is primarily anti-Semitism, however Vigrid had 
shown some interest in Muslims (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 11-13). However, the counter-jihadi 
beliefs of the Norwegian Defence League indicates that the group would have a bigger incentive 
to make radical Islamist movements central antagonists in their dualistic view of the world. 
Therefore, the lack of discursive opportunities within the neo-Nazi ideology decreases the 
potential for reciprocal mechanisms of radicalization.  
First, the Norwegian Defence League was formed as a direct affiliation of the British counter-
jihadi group English Defence League, which came in violent conflicts on multiple occasions 
with the radical Islamists group called Al-Mujahiroun (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17; NTB, 2013: 
c; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). Their Norwegian partner could turn out to be a security threat in 
Norway on two levels. The first point is that as an affiliation of the EDL, the NDL could have 
adopted the former’s violent aspect. The second point is that the NDL could have hosted the 
most radicalized members of the British group when they themselves wanted to mobilize in 
demonstrations. The potential for escalations of conflicts and manifestations of radicalism was 
significant.  
The third point is that this thesis seeks to highlight is why the NDL was chosen over SIAN. 
Focusing on the Norwegian Defence League in favor of Stop Islamiseringen av Norge has also 
been a function of which group had the most potential to grow violence. The SIAN leader Arne 
Tumyr estimated a number of 3000 online-members in 2011 (Michelsen, 2012: 11). Even 
though SIAN had more members than the NDL at the time, the latter group saw two former 
members display direct intentions of political violence/terrorism (Breivik 2011 & member from 
2013). This indicates that the risk of outbursts of radicalism was higher within the NDL than 
SIAN, thus a larger potential for escalations of violent conflicts with Profetens Ummah if they 
entered dynamics of HRR. The thesis’s goal is to analyze political opportunity structures with 
pre-existing knowledge of HRR-outcomes; this information is therefore important.  
 
3.4. Comparative case analysis and the method of difference 
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A comparative analysis is often structured by a small number of cases and a large amount of 
variables. This method discovers empirical relationships among variables, and is not a 
methodology of measurement (Lijphart, 1971: 684-685). Arend Lijphart identifies two 
problems: too many variables and few cases. First, the statistical/experimental method can 
generally cope with a larger number of variables than a comparative method and produce 
coherent results. A comparative method is weaker than the other methods in evaluating 
hypotheses. One cannot perform an experimental control through this methodology (Collier, 
1997: 106). The second problem with the comparative method is that some may attach greater 
importance to deviant cases than necessary. This can lead to premature rejections of hypotheses 
and generalizations (Lijphart, 1971: 685-687).  
To eliminate these problems, Lijphart proposes to focus on a small number of comparable 
cases. If we select particular explanatory variables by using theory (Collier, 1997: 106-107), 
we then study these variables and their relationships under controlled conditions. In essence, 
the comparative method mirrors experimental and statistical methods by analyzing variables 
and establishing general empirical relationships among them (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 96). 
The selected cases consist of one positive case of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization and one 
deviant case. The thesis abstains from qualifying “PU vs NDL” as negative case, because we 
have no way of firmly establishing if all the necessary conditions of HRR were present in this 
context before the analysis.  
Lijphart argues that in the situation of two cases with opposed outcomes, the most appropriate 
method is John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference” (Lijphart, 1971: 687-688). Mill introduced 
several methods of inquiry, like the method of agreement, the indirect method of difference, and 
the method of concomitant variation (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 102-111). The method of 
difference is considered reliable due to its dependence of the logical experimental design 
(Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 99). In a MoD, the focus rests on the dependent variable across cases: 
the goal is to find the set of relevant independent variables (Anckar, 2008: 392-393). Here, the 
theoretical framework behind the concept of HRR determines which independent variables 
constitute the political opportunity structures.  
Mills most different system design compares sub-system that share a common number of 
features. This method ensures that we can highlight some differences, while neutralizing others. 
The cases share common characteristics, but are deviant on some explanatory factors (Moses 
& Knutsen, 2007: 99). Thus, the fact that the method of difference aims at uncovering simple 
sufficient causes makes it more suited than Mills alternative method of agreement in which the 
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approach reveals necessary causes for a phenomenon (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2014: 20). In this 
thesis, we have two cases where the HRR-outcomes after inter-group co-existence are different. 
We then identify explanatory variables and compare them in the cases to uncover why 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization occurred or not. This would logically be due to the 
temporal state of one or more independent variables (Anckar, 2008: 393-394).  
By conducting such a method of inquiry, Mill expects to deduce conclusions about the 
phenomenon and its necessary conditions. Assumptions can be made about causal effects by 
using a method of difference: “[…] the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, 
is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon” (Heuveln, 
2000: 24; Mill, Book III, Chapter VIII, §4). The collective and independent effects of the 
independent variables on Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization is discussed in the analytical 
part as well as in the conclusion.  
The thesis uses Mill’s method of inquiry to extract the causal effects of the selected independent 
variables. Firstly, the thesis establishes whether variables were contributory or partial for the 
difference in outcomes, in other words causal power. As discussed by Donatella Della Porta 
(Della Porta, 2013: 246), a factor can be either limiting or facilitating for a process of 
radicalization. This determination of causality is explained through a detailed presentation of 
contextual differences, which ultimately defines a qualitative analysis. The analysis is in reality 
on two levels: bilateral relationships in single cases build further cross-case analysis about the 
effect of political opportunity structures for the central concept.  
 
3.5. Reliability and Validity 
Achieving good research requires a certain degree of validity and reliability. The term reliability 
means that the results we find through conducting research should be replicable by other 
researchers using a similar method. In other words, testing an identical method of inquiry should 
produce consistent findings. Reliability also means the accurate collection and recording of 
information. These components define internal reliability (Brink, 1993: 35). This thesis 
performs a review of different forms of documents about the groups in the two cases. The author 
prioritizes academic/official documents to answer the hypotheses, and uses articles only when 
the information about groups or cases are insufficient in the former. This is reflected in the fact 
that there are more articles used in the analysis of the Norwegian Defence League than the three 
other units.  
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As the thesis argues, the method of difference produces more reliable results than the method 
of agreement due to its experimental nature. One can increase the research’s transparency, thus 
describing the research strategy and the method of analysis in detail (Moravcsik, 2014: 48-49). 
This can eventually ensure equal measures from one analysis to another, thus increasing 
external reliability. The thesis presents a framework of variables selected for analysis, thus 
removing interpretive biases. The method of difference is quite simple to perform, thus also 
easily replicable by other scholars (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 99).  
Like reliability, we make the distinction between internal and external validity. Briefly 
described, it defines accuracy and truthfulness of research and measurement. Internal validity 
means that findings should be true representation of reality; conclusions are supported by 
theoretical/empirical structures. For one, the concept gains inclusiveness due the specific 
definition of radicalization used in this thesis (Schmid, 2013). For example, the thesis 
incorporates non-violent radicals as potential actors within the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization. Attaching importance to non-violence in a group-context of radicalization is 
important because some may advocate violence without necessarily using it.  
Ideal external validity means that the reflection of reality is applicable across all relevant groups 
(Brink, 1993: 35). The variables selected in this thesis are interpreted as context-dependent. For 
example, similar ideological groups in different nations could have opposing views on violence. 
Profetens Ummah’s version of radical Islamism does not necessarily represent groups in other 
countries with the same beliefs, as many of their grievances can be dependent of national 
characteristics. Nevertheless, if we study similar types of radical groups/movements in different 
national contexts, generalizable conclusions can be inferred as long as the independent variables 
have comparable structures. In this thesis, this refers to structures of political opportunity for 
inter-group radicalization.  
Mill discusses one weakness with the method of difference: finding “similarity” as in an 
experimental design is not easily achievable. When we compare two systems, institutions or 
cases with similarities, they are probably not alike on every condition except one. Despite these 
weaknesses, social scientists have continued to employ the method of difference (Moses & 
Knutsen, 2007: 99-101). In this analysis, we do find comparability across the two cases. First, 
despite ideological difference between the pair of radical units in the cases, they both consist of 
radical factions in interaction. Second, the analysis focuses on the same opportunity structures 
within Norway. Moses and Knutsen describe four ways to conduct a method of difference: 
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comparison over time, within nations, over areas or counter-factualization (Moses & Knutsen, 
2007: IBID).  
 
3.6. Data Collection and treatment 
In a comparative case analysis such as the one used in this thesis, we use a purposeful sampling 
strategy. As Creswell discusses, a collective case study benefits from “maximum variation 
sampling” of case outcomes to describe multiple perspectives about it. The choice of cases is 
determined in advance by specific criteria, or in this thesis the outcome of a phenomenon under 
investigation (Creswell, 2013: 157): Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Choosing a 
comparative analysis of a positive and a deviant case of HRR reveals opportunity structures 
that facilitated and limited inter-group radicalization (Creswell, 2013: 156).  
Specific sample sizes has been discussed in previous parts. The role of a qualitative study is not 
necessarily to generate generalization itself, but rather to elucidate particular facts about 
specific circumstances (Creswell, 2013: 157). In this case, the causal effect is determined by 
temporal differences of political opportunity structures in Norway. According to Skocpol and 
Somers, the comparison of contexts across different periods is frequently used in comparative 
research (Finifter, 1993: 108).  
 
3.6.1. Temporal triangulation 
The next step is to obtain data on the two cases selected for analysis. Creswell identifies four 
types of information: Observations, interviews, documents and audiovisual material (Creswell, 
2013: 160). A scholar can choose to collect information from one or multiple sources at the 
same time. This practice is defined as triangulation: the combination of two or more types of 
sources. One can also use triangulation of theories, methods or investigators. Performing a 
temporal triangulation signifies that information is gathered from different periods of time, 
places or settings (Thurmond, 2001: 253-254). The time gap between the chosen cases makes 
the method of this kind of method appropriate for research.  
Why use temporal triangulation? First, Thurmond highlights that this type of investigation 
determines if similar outcomes can occur at different temporary intervals (Thurmond, 2001: 
254). The primary goal in this thesis is to explain differences of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization through changing structures of political opportunity. Second, internal validity or 
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credibility augments when we use triangulation (Shenton, 2004: 65-66). Put simply, the 
conclusions we make about a circumstance are legitimized through multiple sources of 
information. This also points to an easier replicability of the results we get by performing the 
analysis.  
Conducting a method of data triangulation means that we get a substantial volume of 
information; therefore, the time and effort required to sort and analyze the information increases 
(Thurmond, 2001: 256-257). The thesis chooses not to perform a methodological triangulation 
because it would have generate an overly ambitious amount for a master’s thesis. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that future research on the matter could greatly benefit from interviews, or 
even quantitative methods like in Jacob Ravndal’s doctorate on right wing terrorism and 
violence in Western Europe (Ravndal, 2017) 
 
3.6.2. Documents 
The work of Della Porta on competitive escalations shows that the concept of inter-group 
radicalization has already been subject to scholarly research. Substantial amounts of 
information exists on the preceding case in our comparative analysis, a case that took place in 
the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s. One potential source of information lies in different 
types of academic documents: PHDs and master’s thesis. Among a large quantity of academic 
literature, the studies of Katrine Fangen (Fangen, 2001) and Tore Bjørgo (Bjørgo et al, 2001) 
on the activities in the period have been noteworthy contributions to the development of general 
knowledge on inter-group radicalization in a Norwegian context.  
Finding direct analyses of relevant inter-group dynamics is quite difficult in the available 
documents. Detailed unilateral group-analysis of events, processes and dynamics are then 
valuable sources of information that facilitate a comparative analysis. Furtherly, the effects of 
counter-radicalization measures can hardly be directly analyzed in an inter-group perspective; 
the thesis discusses bilateral relationships on the basis of unilateral effects of the independent 
variables. Another point is that there exists less general information available about the second 
case than on the social movements and sub-groups in the 1990s and 2000s. This concerns 
primarily the Norwegian Defence League.  
During their most active period, Profetens Ummah got a lot of attention from scholars and the 
media. The analysis of the second case benefits greatly from a relatively important amount of 
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literature on the radical Islamic group. For example, at least four Norwegian dissertations 
written after 2014 have analyzed Profetens Ummah: directly through statements by 
leaders/members of the group themselves, and indirectly through secondary sources like 
newspapers and academic research (Michalsen, 2015; Johansen, 2016; Skoglund, 2014; Skar, 
2015). Researches like Lars Akerhaug, Brynjar Lia, and Sveen & Wigen have also focused their 
attention on the radical Islamists group (Akerhaug, 2014; Lia, 2013; Sveen & Wigen, 2013).  
Contrarily to PU, there are no available dissertations or sizeable analyses on the Norwegian 
Defence league. A few organizations have done short analyses on the group, but there is no 
adequate information in academic literature for the thesis to be able to answer the research 
question. However, ever since 2011, there have been written articles about the radical-right 
group. These documents contain direct interviews with group leaders and administrators, and 
recollect the group’s general activity in the period where they co-existed with Profetens 
Ummah. The organization Antirasistisk Senter has also written about the NDL (Sultan & Steen, 
2014). Lastly, the group’s webpage is still active. The thesis uses this site to discuss ideological 
components in the comparative analysis.  
 
3.6.3. Other methods of analysis – Some considerations 
The theoretical part identifies three independent variables that are analyzed in connection to 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. These are ideology, and counter-radicalization and 
competition. Methods of data collection are exploited to extract out information about the 
independent variables. There are two cases under investigation, and they occur at different 
periods in times. First, the reason for which direct observations is not a suited method of data 
collection is simple: both cases have already unfolded, the first in the 1990s/2000s and the 
second between 2012 and 2014. Such a method is preferable if one conducts an ethnographic 
study, a comparative analysis focuses on past cases (Creswell, 2007: 90-91).  
Second, analyzing audiovisual material is time consuming, and ambitious if we are to couple 
this a large amount of documents. This generates more work than manageable for the time and 
length of a master’s thesis. Analyzing audiovisual material is a possible task; however, some 
have raised their concern about the material available on the internet (Michalsen, 2015: 20-21). 
As Neumann and Kleinmann observe, the field of radicalization is suffering from a lack of 
primary data (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013: 361). Encountering general issues of data-
availability naturally makes this thesis rely on secondary sources. 
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The author estimates that the different sources used in this thesis are more than enough to 
answer the research question. Nevertheless, future research on the subject could benefit from 
primary sources, especially in the case with the Norwegian Defence League. A third source of 
information that could have been valuable is interviews. However, this is only a minor 
weakness. In the first case, scholars have used large amount of primary data in their analyses, 
like Tore Bjørgo (Bjørgo et al, 2001) in Kristiansand or Katrine Fangen (Fangen, 2001) for the 
neo-Nazi movement. Their extensive research on the matter display findings that are highly 
valid as well as reliable.  
In the second case, the validity of information is quite high because Profetens Ummah’s did 
interviews and press conferences with media, direct statements by its members have been 
analyzed in contributions such as Stian Michalsen’s master thesis on PU’s ideology (Michalsen, 
2015). Furthermore, even though there does not exist as much information about the NDL as 
the three other groups, the thesis has found large amounts of information from articles. Different 
leaders have given official interviews with newspapers, like Lena Andreassen and Ronny Alte 
(Ravndal et al, 2012; Jørstad, 2012). One source that the thesis also considers as extremely valid 
is statements from the former PST-infiltrator Christian Høibø, who in 2013 gave several 
interviews about his past in the counter-jihadi group (Mon, 2013; NTB, 2013: a).  
 
3.7. Operationalization 
3.7.1. Ideology  
The first independent variable identified in theory is ideology, or put simply a set of basic 
values. These are combined with political information to create a specific set of stands on 
particular issues (Martin, 2015: 12). Traits that define an ideology may vary greatly. For 
example, there are different views on how the state apparatus should be ran. Radical right 
groups may prefer authoritarian regimes, socialists other types of governments. Since this 
subject ultimately remains irrelevant for the inquiry, ideological attributes should incorporate 
inter-group perceptions.  
Simply put, we look at the ideological nuances in comparison to the antagonist. We want to 
discover if one group sees the other as their ideological enemy, if the group’s goals are in 
conflict with its enemy and if they are willing to use radical actions to obtain them. In general, 
ideology is a quite flexible concept with a cumulative number of attributes. It leaves us the 
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freedom of linking it up to the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization (Guerring, 1997: 
957). The main goal is to find whether ideology makes it strategically rational to enter dynamics 
of HRR.  
Since this is a study of inter-group dynamics, the analytical emphasis should lie on ideological 
features that enables reciprocity and radicalism. We can narrow components down to two 
important characteristics. First, a hostile perception of the counterpart should be an essential 
feature of the ideology on both sides. There is a simple logic: without an ideological enemy, 
the chance of any mutual conflict would be improbable. If an out-group affiliated to a different 
social movement is perceived as a threat to the group’s ideological goal, long-term inter-group 
conflicts are facilitated.  
Second, the thesis views another important discursive opportunity as an ideology that justifies 
the use of either one or more of the three attributes of radicalization, in other words general 
radicalism. Schmid’s definition of radicalization is composed of non-violence, political 
violence and terrorism (Schmid, 2013). Ideology has a facilitating effect on mechanisms of 
radicalization if the narrative accepts or advocates radical measures; vice versa in a more 
moderate ideological narrative. The first hypothesis is the following:  
H1: In Case 1, ideologies constituted discursive opportunities for Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization. In Case 2, ideologies did not constitute discursive opportunities for HRR 
 
3.7.2. Counter-radicalization 
Counter-radicalization policies have minimizing effects on radicalization and radical activities 
(Maklin & Busher, 2015: 63-64). Research of escalating political violence in the 1960s and 
1970s in Germany, Italy and Northern Ireland shows that that police strategies contributed to 
radicalization. Clashes with political movements radicalized sub-groups at the margins with 
initial moderate and peaceful aims (Della Porta, 2012: 247).  
A UN/CTITF report from 2008 highlights nine types of measures from 34 countries that have 
implemented counter-radicalization policies. The report clarifies that “[…] the term counter-
radicalization refers to policies and programs aimed at addressing some of the conditions that 
may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package 
of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to deter 
51 
 
disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming 
terrorists” (CTITF, 2008: 5).  
The definition above is quite inclusive, and denotes the complex interactions between different 
instances of the radicalization process and different parties working on counter-measures in 
society. The thesis has selected three indicators for this independent variable, three types of 
general policies out of nine key strategies (CTITF, 2008: IBID). The thesis aims to identify 
initiatives that could have had direct effect on the activities of Norwegian Defence League and 
Profetens Ummah. Some programs seem to have smaller effects on the group’s activities than 
others. For instance, the thesis does not select “prison programs” (CTITF, 2008: 8) because 
both PU and NDL were active outside of prison walls. The reeducation of convicts is intuitively 
not very “limiting” for the reciprocal radicalization processes in this thesis.  
The first type of counter-radicalization initiative chosen for analysis is legislation, which 
punishes illegal narrative/actions and has a preventative effect on the general level of 
unauthorized activity. A change in structural opportunities is therefore when legislation 
becomes increasingly obstructing for radical engagement (UN/CTITF, 2008: 16-18) because it 
can punish committed crimes and prevent the spread of ideologies. For example, incarcerations 
can have consequences for a group’s general lifespan and activity. If Norwegian laws on 
radicalism have changed from the first case to the second, it might indicate limited opportunity 
structures in context of HRR mechanisms for Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence 
League while active.  
In the conceptual discussion, the thesis finds two arenas in which inter-group interactions 
unfold: physical contact and non-physical contact. Legislation does not solely apply to off-line 
activities; governments have also developed laws for on-line behavior. The internet has become 
a highly relevant arena for the spread of propaganda and general radicalization processes (IPI, 
2010: 2). Both jihadists and right-wing radicals use websites, Facebook groups, YouTube and 
Twitter to a variety of political purposes like recruitment and propaganda (Sunde, 2013: 7).  
How effective laws are often depend on their implementation by government organs. The 
UN/CTITF report refers to the training and qualifying of government agencies as one program 
of counter-radicalization. This component of counter-radicalization is the second indicator the 
thesis has chosen to investigate. Examples of such agencies are police forces and community 
workers. The training consists of accumulating greater knowledge in areas like cultural traits 
and religion, but also of the radicalization process in general (UN/CTITF, 2008: 20). Given that 
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this attribute is limiting for HRR, the thesis expects the general training and qualifications of 
Norwegian agencies to be more developed in the contemporary case than in the 1990s.  
In many cases, the state alone does not have the necessary resources to pursue all counter-
radicalization initiatives. The second indicator that the thesis will examine is the engagement 
of civil society. The government can engage local communities with programs to prevent 
radicalization processes and support individuals that want to disengage from their radical past 
(UN/CTITF, 2008: 6-7). The goal with these types of policies are to offer an alternative solution 
for vulnerable individuals, but also to challenge radical ideologies. The thesis expects civic 
engagement to be more limiting for inter-group radicalization in the second case compared to 
the first, given the different outcomes of the different cases. The second hypothesis is the 
following:  
H2: Counter-radicalization initiatives were limiting structural opportunities for Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization in Case 2, but facilitating in Case 1.   
 
3.7.3. Competition  
As McCauley and Moskalenko theorize in their model of mechanisms of radicalization, inter-
group processes can be driven and magnified by several factors. For example, in a radicalization 
process between groups, ideologically similarities can lead to competition for the same base of 
support (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-425). In their research, they also mention other 
types of radicalization dynamics: competition amongst groups, or competition amongst radicals 
and the state. If government forces wishes to terminate a radical group’s activities, the group 
can respond to repression by reciprocally intensifying their actions (McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2008: 425-426). 
Repression and conflict inflicted by a party onto another can be translated into inter-group 
dynamics, as it is not unlikely that groups may interact with each other. In any case, competition 
intensifies radicalization in McCauley and Moskalenko’s radicalization model (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008). Literature points to factors like supporters, recruitment, resources, 
publicity, legitimacy, prestige or power (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-425). For 
instance, Della Porta discusses competition over specific spaces and political violence. An 
Italian activist explained how violence escalated when police forces tried to empty squatted 
houses (Della Porta, 2013: 71). 
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This factor is perceived as facilitating for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, because 
research finds that inter-group competition augments in-group cohesion, legitimizes the out-
group threat and augments the possibility for escalations of reciprocal radicalization. The 
absence of competition is thus, in the same logic, limiting for the phenomenon. This leads us to 
the third hypothesis:  
H3: Inter-group competition facilitated Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in case 1, but 























In the 1990s/2000s, interactions between two radical movements lead to Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization in Norway. Between 2012 and 2014, co-existing counter-jihadi and radical 
Islamist groups did no engage in similar dynamics, even though their sister-groups in Britain 
displayed escalations of violent conflicts some years earlier. What political opportunity 
structures can explain these differences of outcome? To answer this question, the analytical part 
analyzes three independent variables: ideologies, counter-radicalization initiatives and inter-
group competition. The comparative analysis puts emphasis on the PU/NDL case; the 
independent variables chosen clarify if the structures of political opportunity for Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization were different across the two cases. However, before we investigate 
the effect of the independent variables, let us explore the historical background.  
 
4.1 Historical Background 
4.1.1 The positive case: neo-Nazis versus anti-racists in Norwegian cities 
The theoretical part presents a conceptual framework clarifying the phenomenon of Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization. The three end-states, which might occur when two radical groups 
have a competitive or hostile relationship, are non-violence, violence and terrorism. Scholars 
have analyzed dynamics between the two movements and their subgroups during the 1990s and 
early 2000s (Bjørgo, Fangen). Empirical material shows observations that corresponds mutual 
escalations of tactical innovations as well as multiple of the conceptual end-states of HRR.  
Approximately 30 year ago, Norway experienced the polarization of two radical political 
movements. A few cities saw increasing hostilities and clashes between neo-Nazi and anti-racist 
groups, including Oslo, Kristiansand, Drammen and Stavanger (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 10). The 
neo-Nazi movement appeared at the end of the 1960s, but the “skinhead” period started in the 
early 1990s. This ideological inspiration sourced from the struggles of the British working class 
as well as hooliganism (Fangen, 2001(b): 76-88). A significant number of groups were formed, 
operative but also abolished in the course of the 1990s and the start of the 2000s. Zorn 88, HAT, 
Vigrid, Vikings and Boot Boys were among neo-Nazi groups active in this period (Fangen, 
2001(b): 98-104; Bjørgo, 2005: 50).  
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Opposed to the neo-Nazi radical-right at the time, certain militant groups within the radical left-
wing movement mobilized around an anti-racist ideology. For example, Kristiansand 
experienced the presence of active gangs such as “Valla” or the “Chilean Gang” (Bjørgo, 2005: 
51), as well as “AFA”, “SHARP” and “Blitz” in Oslo (Akerhaug, 2014). Many of these groups 
were quite different in ethnic backgrounds and subcultural preferences. For instance, the Valla 
gang consisted primarily of individuals with a Muslim background (Bjørgo, 2005: 52). Despite 
the differences among the various left-wing groups, they mobilized for a common cause: against 
the racist ideology and actions of the neo-Nazis (Bjørgo, 2005: 51-52).   
 
4.1.2. Indications of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization  
The 1990s and the early 2000s reflects a positive case of the HRR-concept. The two end states, 
non-violence and political violence, occurred multiple times between groups in different cities. 
In some instances, certain acts were so severe that they would have been defined as terrorism 
by modern definitions. Observations did point to a reciprocal innovation of tactical tools in 
conflicts. Provocations and threats, which belongs to the category of non-violent radical actions, 
were quite common tools used by one side towards its enemy (Bjørgo, 2005: 65).  
In some cases, the violence resulted in severely dangerous episodes, grave injuries or even 
murder. Bombs, arms and knifes became legitimized tools in conflicts between the neo-Nazis 
and Blitz in Oslo after 1995. Before 1993-1994, a street fight with bare knuckles was more 
“respected” and legitimate (Fangen, 2001: 223). In Kristiansand, one of the most dangerous 
incidents involved the capturing of a member from the Chilean gang. The neo-Nazis handcuffed 
a man to a lamppost, physically assaulted- and stoned him. This incident performed as a 
retaliation of a previous event involving the opposite sides. The following weekend, around 100 
members of the anti-racist group set a house on fire where neo-Nazis where having a party. 
This incident resulted in no deaths but remained quite grave, and most importantly highlights a 
reciprocal tactical innovation of revengeful acts (Bjørgo, 2005: 65).  
Bombs and other dangerous methods of violence were aimed at specific ideological targets 
(Bjørgo, 2005: 69), as in 1994 when two affiliates of the Neo-Nazi movement invaded the Blitz-
headquarters with dynamite and pistols (Kallevik, 2014: 151-152). Nevertheless, arbitrary 
violence against non-affiliated civilians was common due to physical appearances. The haircut 
or clothes of an individual could give the perception of them belonging to an enemy group, and 
many were beaten up even without belonging to a radical faction. The indirect confrontations 
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did eventually reach a high point of escalation in 2001, when two neo-Nazis murdered the 
Norwegian-Ghanaian minor Benjamin Hermansen; a murder that was primarily motivated by 
racist prejudices (Borgarting Lagmannsrett, 2002: 2). This specific episode led to a plundering 
of recruitment and levels of violence in most parts of the country (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 2015: 
53).  
 
4.1.3. The deviant case: Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League 
As many western nations post 9-11, Norway experienced the activity of two specific ideological 
movements: the radical right and radical Islamism. The 12th of February 2010, “De Frivillige” 
organized a public appeal at Universitetsplassen in Oslo against the Danish Mohammed 
caricatures (Arefjord, 2014: 104; Vinding et al, 2010). In September 2012, some of the 
participants from 2010 formed Profetens Ummah, the first active radical Islamist group in 
Norway (Svendsen & Døvik, 2016). Simultaneously, multiple groups within a fragmented 
radical right movement were also keeping an ongoing activity. For instance, Vigrid, Den 
Nordiske Motstandsbevegelsen, the Norwegian Defence League and Stop Islamiseringen av 
Norge were some of the most active groups in the country at the time (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 
11-18).  
Among several radical right groups in the country, one group became an advocator of anti-
jihadism: the Norwegian Defense League (NDL). This radical-right group was established by 
Rune Hauge in 2010 (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). PU and NDL shared an interesting similarity: 
both were created as affiliations of radical groups in Britain. The main sources of influence 
were the English Defence League in the case of the Norwegian Defence League (Sultan & 
Steen, 2014: IBID) and Islam4UK for Profetens Ummah (Bakke-Foss, 2014; Michalsen, 2015: 
82). In any case, the two groups shared approximately two parallel years of activity on 
Norwegian soil: 2012-2014.  
Intra-group tension resided within the Norwegian Defence League. Certain individuals showed 
their increasing commitment for violent measures, and threats were made against the 
Norwegian parliament (Stortinget). In 2013, a small group of individuals was arrested due to 
former threats against official institutions. “Antirasistisk Senter” judged the risk of violence 
stemming from the NDL to be unclear. Until 2016, the NDL’s primary activity online was 
primarily on Facebook and Twitter (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17).  
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Profetens Ummah was an active radical group in the Norway from January 2012 to 2016. The 
group arranged multiple demonstrations in the period, mostly in connection to the Norwegian 
government’s role in international politics and other symbolic events. The group activity got 
highlighted in the media when it became known that some members of PU tried to get in 
possession of firearms, made threats against journalists and witnesses in trials. Some of the 
members travelled to Syria to take part in the activities of the Islamic State. It is estimated that 
the group had a core of 15-20 members, but its influence and mobilization potential expanded 
to approximately 70-100 individuals (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 22-24; Vepsen, 2012: 10).  
 
4.1.4. No observations of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization  
Norway has experienced Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between radical groups, defined 
by reciprocal tactical innovations towards three manifestations of radicalism: non-violence, 
political violence and terrorism. Despite some theorizing about an ideological symbiosis 
between radical Islamists and radical right groups like in Great Britain, the period of 2012-2014 
did not contain forms of inter-group activity that fit the concept of HRR. Instead, the historical 
period in the Norwegian context which contains a positive case of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization was between neo-Nazi groups and anti-fascists/racists in the 1990s (Bjørgo, 
2005; Bjørgo et al, 2001).  
There were minor instances where interactions did occur, but without any real significance for 
confirming Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. As argued earlier, the indirect strategies of 
contact are very difficult to tie to the groups themselves, so for clarity and optimal measurement 
we have to focus on direct contact. In forms of (non-radical) non-violence, a few episodes are 
noteworthy. One case of interaction occurred when Profetens Ummah mobilized against a 
demonstration from the NDL in December 2012. Ubaydullah Hussain and a few other members 
“assisted” an anti-racism counter-protest against the NDL, very close to the geographical 
location of the initial radical right manifestation. No forms of non-violent radicalism (pressure 
and coercion), neither political violence or terrorism were observed (Gunnersen, 2012; Olsson 
et al, 2012). 
Reciprocal group criticism was also an occasional phenomenon, particularly online. Twitter 
Facebook and other social media used by the radical groups illustrates reactionary behavior. 
This was especially the case for NDL, which publicly condemned Profetens Ummah on some 
occasions (Norwegian Defence League, 2014). Many of the public statements and comments 
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of radicals came right after certain incidents. When Ubaydullah Hussain praised Michael 
Adebolajo for the murder of Lee Rigby, strong reactions came from the NDL Facebook page 
(Gunnersen, 2012). 
PU did also react to the activities of Norwegian Defence League. Against the radical-right 
demonstrations in December 2012, they warned the police on social media to monitor members 
of the NDL (Gunnersen, 2012). In January 2012, a prominent figure of Profetens Ummah Arfan 
Bhatti sent a mail to the current leader of NDL Ronny Alte. In his e-mail, Bhatti called Alte 
infidel (kafir), challenged him to meet him alone and warned him about Islam and sharia’s 
arrival in Norway. According to Bhatti, the email was a response to an earlier review Alte made 
of him. Alte reported this incident to the police, but the case was ruled in Bhatti’s favor 
(Brunmark, 2015, Karlsen, 2012).  
Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence league did rarely meet under physical 
circumstances; apart from December 2012, contact did generally unfold on the web. However, 
in October 2015 the former leader of the NDL Ronny Alte formed a group called “Odins 
Soldater (Soldiers)”. It had the purpose of patrolling the streets for safety, as a reaction to the 
new wave of refugees. While it was meant mostly as a joke (Vedler et al, 2016), the reaction 
from members of Profetens Ummah was real. In response to Odins Soldiers, the group “Allah’s 
Soldater” was created with the same patrolling agenda (Brenna et al, 2016). While this latter 
episode occurred after 2014, it still demonstrates some reciprocal dynamics between the radical-
right and radical Islamist movements.  
Ultimately, there are no evidence of reciprocal non-violent- or violent radicalism. Radical right 
subgroups patrolled cities like Drammen; in contrast, the Islamist subgroup was active in Oslo. 
These latter episodes do show moments of reciprocal tactical innovations, but in no forms of 
radicalism. Thus, we cannot conclude that there were any observable signs of Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization. All events between 2012 and 2014 came as non-violent, 
asymmetrical interactions. When Bhatti sent threats to the current leader of Norwegian Defence 
League, Alte contacted the police instead of initiating exchanges of non-violent radicalism 
(Karlsen, 2012). This latter case was probably the closest indicator of any HRR-dynamic, but 
as a feud between two individuals.  
In sum, when we look back at the historical background, we can observe the presence of 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the first case. In contrast, the second case displayed no 
signs of HRR; there were no developments of tactical innovations or sustained inter-group 
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radicalism between Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League. Nevertheless, the 
groups had some interesting interactions that reinforce the legitimacy of the research question. 
Why did Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization occur between anti-racist and neo-Nazi groups, 
but not between Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League? The next parts will seek 
to answer this question. Let us begin with a discussion about ideology.   
 
4.2 Ideology:  
4.2.1. Unclear ideological antagonism 
In her research on political violence, Donatella Della Porta finds that one type of discursive 
opportunity for political violence are narratives that accepts and advocates it (Della Porta, 2013: 
248). An important mechanism of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization is reciprocal alienation 
of an enemy group. Thus, the thesis argues that inter-group mechanisms are facilitated by levels 
of hostility towards outgroups located within the ideology. Given the differences of outcomes 
of HRR, the thesis hypothesizes that the first case must have contained higher levels of mutual 
hostility than the contemporary one. 
In the 1990s, Norway experienced the activity of groups in cities like Oslo and Kristiansand. 
They were confined to two movements: the neo-Nazis and the anti-racists. However, in reality, 
this depiction is a generalization. Within the two movements, there were different sub-groups, 
each with distinct ideas and beliefs. For example, some factions within the “neo-Nazi” 
movement were more inspired by American racism than German National Socialism (Bjørgo 
et al, 2001: 42). Still, the general tendency was that groups on both sides gradually polarized 
into two identifiable movements: racism and neo-Nazism. In many ways, units within the 
factions organized around these grievances (Bjørgo, 2005: 46, 68).  
Scholars have found that mutual hate/stigmatization was a central driver of the inter-group 
dynamics in the 1990s/2000s. This was also visible in the second half of the century, when the 
movements had been interacting with each other quite some time, strengthening the 
mechanisms of polarization and radicalization (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 43; Kallevik, 2014: 151-
155). In 1993-1994, Katrine Fangen observed that members of the “Blitz” community defined 
their struggles against the Neo-Nazis as primarily an ideological battle where the ultimate goal 
is to destroy fascism (Fangen, 2001: 78). Bjørgo et al describe the ideological relations as 
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“binary moral positions”; the organization of groups within the different movements revolved 
around two distinct ideological poles (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 67-68).  
How strong was the levels of hate? In “XTRM”, Jan Kallevik observes the levels of hostility 
from an anti-racist perspective: “Isn’t it wonderful to have someone to hate. I wonder if I will 
ever feel a feeling of emptiness when we have finally destroyed them” (Kallevik, 2014: 162). 
This statement demonstrates how many individuals of the anti-racist group “Sharp Skins” felt 
about their enemy and personal duties. The subgroup “Antifascistisk Aksjon” or AFA even gave 
out their independent magazine six times a year where they kept updated information about 
neo-Nazi activity (Kallevik, 2014: 163). On the neo-Nazi side, Fangen observes that the anti-
racist confrontational strategies lead to a gradual molding of their ideology. She states that their 
attacks eventually gave the neo-Nazis a concrete enemy (Fangen, 2001: 234).  
The polarization and alienation of the two sides were able to continue along the course of the 
1990s, but they also amplified with time. One important reason for sustained ideological 
alienation between the movements was fashion. To publicly appear as either Neo-Nazi or anti-
racist reinforced in-group identities, but did also provoke the opposition. The use of “saggy” 
pants was perceived as a sign of an affiliation to an anti-racist group. On the other side, Neo-
nazi uniforms, skinned heads or Nazi symbols indicated the individuals’ neo-Nazi/racist moral 
position (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 83-85).  
Ultimately, the first case displays a symmetrical relationship of ideological alienation between 
the movement/counter-movement. In light of the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization, this component was certainly facilitating for further inter-group radicalization. 
Not only did it sustain all the way through the 90s, but it also intensified in the middle of the 
decade. How then, about Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League? 
The British context has shown that it is possible for non-violent contact and violent interactions 
to occur between Islamist and counter-jihadi movements. Roger Eatwell discussed the possible 
ideological symbiosis between the factions, the activities of one reinforces the others’ 
grievances and so on (Kundnani, 2012; Eatwell, 2006; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). A general 
observation from scholars is there is no data to establish a firm ideological interdependence 
between them, most signs point to an asymmetrical link where the radical-right is influenced 
by the radical Islamists, not vice versa (Stormark & Strømmen, 2015; Nawaz, 2012).  
Profetens Ummah was the first active radical Islamist group in Norway. The group arranged 
demonstrations, press conferences, gave interviews to newspapers and had an important level 
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of activity online. Many in the Norwegian academic circles gained interest in this group as soon 
as it established itself as an important actor in the country. After reviewing a substantial number 
of texts and public statements made by members of the group, Sveen and Wigen concluded that 
Profetens Ummah lands under the category of Islamism characterized as Salafism (Sveen & 
Wigen, 2013: 276).  
The Salafi doctrine is a fundamentalist version of Islamism. In Salafism, the ideal way of life 
is identical to the first generations of Muslims, the Salafs. Salafists want all societies to be ruled 
by the Islamic laws sharia, and views western government interventions on Arabic soil to be 
illegitimate. The important point is that Profetens Ummah believes that Muslim repression is a 
global phenomenon, often by western cultures imposed on them. These are incompatible with 
the “true” Islamic faith, and indoctrinate Muslims away from the real belief. For PU, all 
Muslims are at war with the west (Sveen og Wigen, 2013: 281).  
Profetens Ummah has two perspectives on repression: international and domestic politics. In 
international politics, PU considers the Norwegian government as an important contributor to 
a global problem of Muslim repression. American, British and Norwegian modern warfare in 
Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and others was an important grievances for the group 
(Michalsen, 2015: 51-52), especially before the arrival of the Islamic state in 2014. This is 
illustrated by a video that Profetens Ummah released in 2012 on Youtube, in which there figures 
threats against the Norwegian royal family and politicians like the foreign minister Jonas Gahr 
Støre and the Prime minster Jens Stoltenberg. The primary message in the video was the 
following: “Norwegian Soldiers out of Afghanistan” (Ihlebæk et al, 2012) 
In domestic politics, they mention three important actors. These are the Norwegian government, 
the general populace and the media (Michalsen, 2015: 53). They also argue that the cooperation 
between imams and the government helps spread “twisted” ideas to Muslims in the country 
(Michalsen, 2015: 57). As we see, the Norwegian Defence League is not held responsible for 
the repression of the Muslim population, in Norway, nor the general counter-jihadism 
movement in the international context. A recurrent observation is that the Norwegian Defence 
League, as well as any other counter-jihadist group do not figure in the PU-narrative as a 
primary enemy. Given that the English Defence League has gotten in numerous conflicts with 
groups from the radical Islamists movements, it is interesting that its Norwegian affiliation does 
not get perceived as a potential hinder to the Salafist group’s political goals. What about the 
Norwegian Defence League? 
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The Norwegian Defence League has been defined as a radical group with counter-jihadi beliefs 
(Vepsen, 2012; Sultan & Steen, 2014). On their webpage, NDL states that: 
 “The NDL wishes to limit Islam’s’ influence in Norway. […] The only demand we have for you is that 
you also think that the ongoing Islamization damages our country and the rest of Europe. […] If you 
wish to participate in our work to stop and reverse Islamization in Norway, you are welcome to NDL.” 
(Norwegian Defence League, 2017) 
For NDL, the problem for Norway and the rest of the world is thus an Islamization of societies. 
The radical-right group believed in an Islamic suppression of European culture. It resembles 
the Salafist ideology of PU because it has two agendas, a European cultural concern for Islamic 
imperialism and a local agenda in Norway. As we see, the Norwegian Defence league wants to 
prevent Islamization primarily in Norway. NDL’s argument suffers from certain obscurities, 
especially in relation to their understanding of Islam and Muslims. Which version of Islam is 
dangerous? Who performs the Islamization of western societies? Are all Muslims threats, or 
does the real threat come from radical Islamists with totalitarian and violent intentions? NDL 
states that:  
“We do not accept racism and personal attacks. Such attitudes can lead to an eviction. Islam is no race, 
and Muslims exist in every denominations”. […] Islamization is to adapt to Islam, which is a demanding 
and suppressing cult. One example is England, where sharia-courts now operate parallel with the 
English justice system. (Norwegian Defence League, 2017). 
Norwegian Defence League’s definition of Islamization is quite vague and essentially 
contradictory. For one, they firmly discard any forms of racism again Muslims. The vagueness 
comes from the fact that NDL does not specify which parts of the Muslim community that is 
conducting the Islamization. This means that NDL has the potential to mold their grievances in 
flexible ways; every individual who they perceive to have intentions of suppression by 
introducing sharia can be a danger. Nevertheless, this definitional vagueness signifies that 
Profetens Ummah could have had a great potential influence on the radical-right group.  
In an objective perspective, PU was an important actor: the largest radical Islamist group on 
Norwegian soil. Salafism in general, but also the specific doctrine of Profetens Ummah, 
advocates the incompatibility between Islam and western culture (Sveen & Wigen, 2013; 
Michalsen, 2015). This is something that the Norwegian Defence League could perceive as 
“Islamization”, but PU’s doctrine also simultaneously legitimizes NDLs worldview. The 
organization Vepsen observed some NDL members’ satisfaction over Ubaydullah Hussain’s 
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supporting statements after the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. On their webpage, comments 
were expressing how PU’s actions gave people “the right view of Muslims” (Vepsen, 2013).  
Most signs point to an asymmetrical or (even non-existent) relationship in ideology. 
Nevertheless, given the central role of Islamization of Norway in the ideology of Norwegian 
Defence League, the activities of Profetens Ummah would not have gone under NDL’s radar 
in practice. This first independent variable demonstrates a major ideological (inter-group) 
difference between the two cases, but does not disallow a potential Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization in the contemporary case. In his research, Tore Bjørgo observed that the 
perception the anti-racists had of neo-Nazi fractions radicalized with the accumulation of 
clashes between the groups (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 42). These dynamics need therefore to develop 
over time.  
In theory, the Norwegian Defence League might have become an important factor of Muslim 
oppression in the ideology of Profetens Ummah if the contact between the groups had continued 
over longer periods. However, the influence of one element stole much of NDL’s spotlight: the 
Islamic State. One of the main goals of PU was to establish an Islamic State. When the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) was formed in 2014, and the group celebrated; it was a legitimate 
Caliphate in accordance with the Salafi ideology of Profetens Ummah (Michalsen, 2015: 64-
66). After the rise of Daesh, most of PUs attention moved towards this new ideal state. Despite 
the fact that the Islamic State arrived on the international scene as late as 2014, it reduced the 
chance that counter-jihadi movements and subgroups could ever become grievances in the 
Norwegian radical Islamist group. External circumstances functioned as a de-escalating factor 
for mechanisms of inter-group radicalization.  
Ultimately, Profetens Ummah’s political goals illustrate that the modern case did not contain a 
symmetrical ideological relationship like the one that influenced within the positive case of 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization from the 1990s. This section argues that the groups’ 
narratives were more limiting structures of political opportunities for Profetens Ummah and 
Norwegian Defence League than the ideological relations in the first case. This was true for the 
first steps of the molding of inter-group perception of hostility, in other words the very 
beginning of HRR-mechanisms. The primary causes for this were static components of 
ideology, but developments in the global scene did also have a dynamic significance for 
especially Profetens Ummah’s grievances. The next section discusses the aspect of violence 
across the two cases.  
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4.2.2 Political violence and terrorism  
In the last sequence, the thesis shows that the second case lacked mutual perceptions of hostility. 
Most signs indicate an asymmetrical relationship, where the Norwegian Defence League would 
(ideologically) be prone to perceive Profetens Ummah as a relatively important grievance, but 
with no visible effect in the opposite direction. Tore Bjørgo observed that groups within the 
anti-racist movement of the 1990s did develop a hostile perception of neo-Nazi groups after the 
latter had initiated violent acts on immigrants, radicalism against non-affiliated targets lead to 
processes of radicalization (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 43).  
Accumulated acts of radicalism can activate opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization in narrative. In the 1990s, violence was widely accepted amongst several 
subgroups within the two movements. Bjørgo observed that groups in Kristiansand developed 
violent subcultures where the dominating ideology was to retaliate violence with violence. 
Nevertheless, violent confrontations did not arise overnight. Both sides were separately active 
in the Norwegian society before they turned on each other. They had already used forms of 
violence before they engaged in confrontations with each other (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 89); they 
were in many ways pre-radicalized.  
The neo-Nazi movement rose in the end of the 1960s, and mobilized through anti-communism 
and anti-immigration. Bombs detonated in a 1st of May workers demonstration (1979), and 
against a Muslim Nor-mosque in Oslo (1985). Two neo-Nazis did also murder their two 
comrades in Hadeland (1981) in fear of snitching (Fangen, 2001: 76-78). On the other side, the 
anti-racists factions attained an important level of radicalization before the 1990s; their gradual 
radicalization was due to accumulated (violent) conflicts with police forces (Kallevik, 2015: 
58-66). Thus, the most militant anti-racist factions were already accustomed to violence as a 
tactical tool in conflicts. Clashes with third parties gradually legitimized violent means when 
the neo-Nazi movement entered the scene in growing numbers.  
The counter-movements did also share one common source of influence that contributed to pre-
radicalization: the skinhead culture. This style came from British hooliganism, and was a 
macho-characterized, hooligan environment, where collective identities were somewhat 
defined by violence (Fangen, 81). The skinhead culture became a larger part of the culture in 
most neo-Nazi sub-groups, but did also influence parts of the anti-racist community, like the 
Skinhead against Racial Prejudice or SHARP (Fangen, 2001: 87-90). Therefore, violence 
became legitimized through an importation of a cultural movement.  
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Unilateral activity and interactions with third party actors produced high levels of radicalization 
before the 90s, which made it very easy for violence to be accepted a legitimate tool in the 
resolution of inter-group conflicts. Fangen explains that there were established norms of 
violence that changed after specific periods in time. For example, before 1993/1994, conflicts 
between groups were legitimate when both sides had an equal number of participants. If both 
parts used fists in fights, the method was considered legitimate. After 1994, the violence 
escalated in nature. Bombs, knives, firearms and “raw” street violence became more frequently 
accepted tools by both sides (Fangen, 2001: 222-225; Kallevik, 2015: 151-159).  
The first case showed that violence was not just important for resolving conflicts. It was also 
essential to create identities. Violent conflicts solidified in-group cohesions because it gave 
both sides a concrete enemy to fight. This legitimization of violence was therefore a very 
important structural opportunity for sustained Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization because it 
amplified in-group radicalization, which then again sparked long-lasting tactical innovations of 
radicalism (Fangen, 2001: 234). Violence and ideology had mechanisms of mutual 
reinforcement.  
The groups in the contemporary case were much more resilient to use political violence than 
the neo-Nazis and anti-racists. This was primarily the case for the Norwegian Defence League, 
which struggled with internal disagreements on violence and terrorism. On their webpage, NDL 
writes that: “[…] it is not violence we stand for” (Norwegian Defence League, 2017). There 
were no observations of pressure, coercion or violent actions stemming from NDL members, 
neither in their multiple demonstrations between 2011 and 2014, or in any other context. The 
available information shows that the NDL leadership rejected members with violent intentions. 
The Norwegian radical-right group did not resemble the English Defence League in every 
strategical aspect: “It was pretty clear that [the EDL’s] tactics were designed to provoke, and 
hopefully create violence” (Communities Minister John Denham (2009) in - Bartlett and 
Birdwell, 2013: 4). 
There are also additional instances that highlight the non-tolerance of violence in the Norwegian 
Defence League. Anders Behring Breivik, with the pseudonym “Sigurd Jorsalfar”, was banned 
by the group’s administrators from taking part in the discussion on the web in 2010 due to his 
radical beliefs (NTB, 2013: a). In 2012, the leader Ronny Alte left the group because there was 
internal disagreements about if the group should support the terrorist acts of Breivik (Ravndal 
et al, 2012). Later the same year, the deputy leader Lars Aardal denied all claims of violent 
intentions: “NDL has always taken distance from violence or terrorism” (Jørstad, 2012) 
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Why was violence so illegitimate for NDL? One reason is that the leaders of the group simply 
were not collectively supporting violence. Another is that there was significant problems of 
legitimacy for the radical-right ideology. The social movement tried to grow in a country that 
had been deeply shocked by two symbolic events: the murder of Benjamin Hermansen (2001) 
and more importantly the terrorist attacks of Anders B. Breivik (2011). These incidents lead 
to a zero-tolerance and a massive de-legitimization of the use of violence by radical-right 
actors. The 2001 murder plundered recruitment within the neo-Nazi movement and sparked 
massive counter-reactions from large parts of the Norwegian society (Bjørgo & Gjelsvik, 
2015: 132). 
The deep de-legitimization of radical-right intolerance was furtherly highlighted when the 
NDL-leader Ronny Alte left the group because of it got numerous associations with Breivik 
and his ideology (Ravndal et al, 2012). In the post-22/7 period, nearly all popular figures in 
Norway tried to distance themselves from Breivik’s ideology and actions. For example, the 
Norwegian prime minster Jens Stoltenberg asked the media to reduce the anti-immigrant 
rhetoric, while the Progress Party (FRP) even apologized for their inflammatory discourse 
(Wiggen, 2012: 603). A third important factor to take into account is the political success of 
right-wing populism in the 21th century. Jacob Ravndal finds lower levels of violence and 
terrorism in Western European countries that have had populist parties who have reached over 
10% support over longer periods, like Fremskrittspartiet’s political success and the open 
debate on immigration in Norway. Political representations functions as a swamp for the 
mobilization to the radical extremities (Ravndal, 2017: 108; Vestheim, 2017).  
In their summary of radical groups in Norway in 2012, Antirasistisk Senter stated, “the primary 
risk from groups like NDL lies in the (violent) potential of individuals connected to such 
environments” (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). The organization anticipated that violence would 
only come from outskirts of the group, most likely by a lone wolf. NDL harbored ideas that 
were common for radicalized individuals with violent intentions. Øyvind Strømmen expressed 
similar concerns in the media (Rognsvåg, 2012: a).  
The Norwegian Defence League could have functioned as an inspirational source, but not by 
its own intention. In fact, NDL reduced the risk of violence, by throwing out potentially 
dangerous members out of the group as soon the administrators noticed high levels of 
radicalization. Nevertheless, Antirasistisk Senter’s prediction was somewhat confirmed 
through the cases of Breivik in 2011 (as a former NDL member on Facebook) and the threats 
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against Stortinget made by an NDL-affiliated in February 2013 (Sultan & Steen, 2014: IBID; 
Vestrum et al, 2013).   
Unlike the Norwegian Defence League, Profetens Ummah accepted and promoted violence. 
The thesis defines Profetens Ummah as Salafi, and scholars who have analyzed their narrative 
conclude that the group goes under the category of jihadi-Salafism (Sveen & Wigen, 2013: 276, 
Holmer, 2016: 5). In order to rule the world by sharia, they accept the use of violent jihad. 
When questioned by a journalist, Ubaydullah Hussain legitimized jihad by portraying it as 
“defensive revenge” of repression by the west (Michalsen, 2015: 50-51). This legitimization of 
violence by PU is quite similar to the methods used by the groups in the 1990s; interviewed 
neo-Nazis characterized the reciprocal violent conflicts as vengeance of former attacks done by 
enemy groups (Fangen, 2001: 229).  
In reality, Profetens Ummah did not use political violence against neither Norwegian Defence 
league nor other parties in the Norwegian society. In some occasions, prominent members made 
threats against the Norwegian government and the royal family (Linge, 2013: 50), but 
ultimately, their perception of global Jihad was primarily towards external sources like 
Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria (Michalsen, 2015: 73-74). This explains why the group’s primary 
strategy was the recruitment of a significant number of Norwegian foreign fighters to Syria 
(Jørstad et al, 2014). 
Profetens Ummah appeared quite moderate in term of violence on Norwegian territory. Brynjar 
Lia argues that the radical Islamist group differed from international Jihadists because the latter 
see every activity except from violence as a waste of time. In contrast, Profetens Ummah chose 
non-violent forms of mobilization, through demonstrations and press conferences. Lia 
concludes: “we have gotten a more moderate variant” (Brynjar Lia in; Sveen & Wigen, 2013: 
276). The group imported non-violent methods of political contention, while it exported 
violence to other geographical locations.  
Why where the groups in the first case prone to violence? The thesis observes clear signs of 
facilitated opportunity structures within the narrative. For instance, radicalization mechanisms 
in the first case were molded by former conflicts with third parties, like the “pre-radicalization” 
of the radical-left movement in ongoing clashes with police forces (Kallevik, 2015: 58-66). 
However, another in-group characteristic that could have facilitated Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization in the second case is the number of members each group were able to mobilize.  
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In the first case, both the neo-Nazi- and anti-racist movements had large amounts of active 
participants, especially after the incidents of Brumunddal in 1991 (Fangen, 2001: 91). In the 
contemporary case, Profetens Ummah had 15 core-members. However, it was estimated that 
their mobilization potential could have reached 70-100 individuals. On the other hand, the 
different protests of Norwegian Defence League indicated that their off-line mobilization was 
of approximately 30-40 individuals (Volden, 2012; Sandmo et al, 2013), despite a larger 
number of memberships on their website. In reality, the NDL struggled to gather more than 40 
to their different demonstrations, often significantly less (Gunnersen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012; 
Sandmo et al, 2013).  
The thesis mentions strengthening of in-group cohesions in the first cases through clothing 
“styles”, but the levels of radicalization could also be a function of the number of members. As 
more individuals joins the factions, they legitimize an opposite threat and thus radicalize the 
enemy group. McCauley and Moskalenko argue that interactions between governments and 
radicalized groups leads to amplified radicalization mechanisms, as terrorist cells emerge and 
go underground to follow their political objectives (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 425). 
Therefore, a larger number of affiliates could have increased the recruitment of more 
individuals with violent militant intentions, which could have formed ultra-radical sub-fractions 
in comparison to the consensus (on violence) within the social movement.  
 
4.2.3. Hypothesis 1 – Ideology as a discursive opportunity 
In conclusion, the available data points to limited discursive opportunities for Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case compared to the first: the thesis confirms the first 
hypothesis (H1). In the first case, the ideological components had strong mutual alienation of 
the counterpart as well as a perception of violence as a legitimate tool of conflict resolution. 
These components mutually reinforced one another and were important factors for the gradual 
radicalization of the groups, which eventually resulted in an escalation of violence.  
In contrast to the first case, Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League had limited 
structural opportunities for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in their narrative. The first 
reason is that the ideological relationship between the two groups is far from an 
“interdependence”, a notion that has been hypothesized between similar groups in Britain. At 
most, we find an asymmetrical perception of an enemy. The Norwegian Defence League is 
prone to care more about Profetens Ummah’s activities than the opposite; NDL’s primary goal 
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is to limit the power of radical Islamism in Norway. On the contrary, PU’s global agenda of 
Jihad gives limited attention to the Norwegian anti-jihadi group; governments, media and police 
forces cause the international Muslim oppression (Michalsen, 2015: 53) 
The latter section highlights the second reason, which is that the first case displayed high 
potentials of violence due to the legitimization of it by both sides. However, the thesis finds no 
direct appeal to violence on Norwegian soil by Profetens Ummah. They lost an important 
mobilization potential after 2014 because they exported highly radicalized Norwegian jihadists 
to the Syrian regional conflict instead of fighting the war at home. The legitimization of 
violence was also asymmetrical in the second case because the Norwegian Defence League did 
not accept violence by any of its members. Two affiliated individuals displayed high enthusiasm 
for violence; however, they were thrown out of the group by its moderators/leaders (Sultan & 
Steen, 2014: 17). The NDL narrative was ultimately problematic because it could have 
influenced lone wolfs, but by no direct intention of the group itself.  
 
4.3. Counter-radicalization: 
The analysis of ideological components concludes that the opportunity structures for Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization in the narrative were more limiting in the PU/NDL case than in the 
1990s/2000s. Della Porta argues that mechanisms of radicalization are activated by interactions 
between groups, which means that the thesis supplements the ideological analysis with factors 
that could facilitate or limit inter-group contact. Preventive policies have a limiting effect on 
the groups’ activities, both in unilateral and bilateral perspectives. Counter-radicalization is thus 
the next variable to analyze. In the next section, the thesis investigates the effects of legislation, 
the training of agencies and the engagement of civil society on Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization across the two cases. 
 
4.3.1. Legislation  
In the analysis of legislative changes, we have to target laws that affect the different forms of 
activities of the radical groups. Legislation sets limits to certain freedoms of action, and there 
have been two important changes that have considerably affected the activities of the radical 
groups in the second case compared to the first: laws on discrimination and laws on terrorism.  
70 
 
First, the thesis discusses the effects of the reforms of the Norwegian paragraph on 
discrimination, or §135a. This had major implications for the liberty of radical narrative in 
public spaces. Second, numerous terrorist attacks since 2001 have made counter-terrorism a 
central focus in the battle against radicalization. Expert on terrorism Jan Oskar Engene argues 
that the Norwegian laws on terror changed from reactive to preactive forms of legal intervention 
since 9.11.2001 (Engene, 2013: 234). This evolution is the second component discussed in this 
part. The thesis argues that the extensiveness of the new legislation on terrorism was an 
important obstruction in the second case, especially for Profetens Ummah.  
 
Limitations of radical narrative - Paragraph §135a:   
The paragraph on racism, or law §135a, was introduced in Norway in 1970. From 1977 to 2001, 
seven individuals were convicted for racial discrimination (Larsen, 2001). At first glance, this 
seems like a small number compared to the numerous incidents that unfolded in the years of 
the highest neo-Nazi activity. In 2000, the leader of the neo-Nazi group “Boot Boys” spoke at 
a demonstration where he discussed how Jews and immigrants were damaging the country. The 
Norwegian Supreme Court ruled Terje Sørlie innocent because he did not appeal to violence, 
and he was protected by the constitutional law of free speech (§100) (Regjeringen, 2005). 
Organization like Antirasistisk Senter and the Mosaic societies of Oslo and Trondheim later 
sent a formal complaint to the UN’s racial discriminatory committee, as they argued that §135a 
did not fully protect against racist discriminations (Back, 2002).  
The paragraph 135a of racial discriminations did eventually go through three major waves 
reforms. In January 2003, the law incorporated the use of certain symbols as a racist offence. 
In 2005, the punishment for racial profanities increase from two to three years, the definition 
of what constitutes a public statement was changed, and the cause of punishment changed from 
solely ethnical backgrounds to incorporate discriminations against religions and sexual 
orientations (NOU, 2005). Lastly, in 2013 the law changed so that statements on the internet 
were considered declarations in public space. It now specifies a reach of 20-30 individuals 
(Sunde, 2013: 35-36; 66-67).  
How are the changes to §135a important? The Sørlie-episode highlights an important contrast 
in the freedom of speech across the two periods. Before 2000, discriminatory rhetoric was legal 
as long as the narrative did not advocate violence or discrimination against ethnical 
backgrounds. The first consequence of the reforms was that Profetens Ummah and the 
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Norwegian Defence League had far less off-line freedom of speech than the groups in the 1990s. 
One example is that the neo-Nazis could use provoking symbols like the swastika (Fangen, 
2001: 192-193), but this was no longer legal after 2005. The increased penalties for 
discrimination were probably an incentive for the groups to keep their narrative within the 
accepted frames of speech, illustrated by the official refute to advocate violence by the 
Norwegian Defence League (Norwegian Defence League, 2017).  
In 2012, Ronny Alte described a struggle to reach an ideological consensus in the NDL on 
racism and violence (Ravndal et al, 2012). One important change was that violent and racist 
ideas went through a substantial de-legitimization process after the episodes of Benjamin 
Hermansen and Anders Behring Breivik. If radicalized individuals are understood as rational 
actors (Borum, 2011a: 14), then the preventive effects of legislative punishments would also 
have been influential in the strategical considerations of members of the Norwegian Defence 
League. Ideological consensus in the neo-Nazi group was quite important for the development 
of a stronger in-group cohesion (Fangen, 2001: 146); a driver of radicalization mechanisms 
according to McCauley and Moskalenko (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 423-424) 
The second important consequence of the §135a reforms was the reduction of freedom of 
speech online. Discriminatory statements were much harder to make after the 2005 and 2013 
reforms, and Profetens Ummah was punished by this through the shutdown of their Facebook 
page (Steenvågnes, 2014). Inger Marie Sunde observes that social media was the most 
important platform for Profetens Ummah in terms of mobilization, distribution of propaganda, 
discussion and internal coordination (Sunde, 2013: 106-107). These online-reforms crippled 
one of the groups most important recruitment channels (Stenvaagnes, 2014). Even though the 
Norwegian Defence League did not experience a shutdown of its webpage due to its more 
moderate narrative, the definitional vagueness of “Islamization” (which specific actors 
responsible, etc.) was strategically rational due to the online extension of law §135a.  
 
Counter-terror legislation: 
There have been numerous terrorist incidents in Western Europe and the United States since 
2001. New York (2001), Madrid (2004), London (2005), Paris (2015), Copenhagen (2015) and 
a significant number of other attacks had important consequences on legislative reforms on 
terrorism. Jan Oskar Engene argues that the changes of counter-terror legislation moved from 
reactive measures towards preactive policies (Engene, 2013: 234). As we shall see, these new 
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laws were principally limiting opportunity structures for the radicalization of Profetens 
Ummah.  
The post-9/11 period resulted in an explosion of new anti-terror laws in Norwegian legislation. 
Before 2001, none of the Nordic countries counted terrorism as a special category in their 
legislation. After 2001, terrorism became criminalized, the penalties against terrorist activities 
were increased and the anti-terror laws were developed to incorporate a broader spectrum of 
actions (Universitetet i Bergen, 2009). The ratification of these laws were primarily because the 
Norwegian state was bound to international conventions, coordinative initiatives came from the 
United Nations and the European Union (Engene, 2013: 234; Husabø, 2004: 182-183).   
The first wave of new anti-terror laws resulted in the implementation of a Norwegian terror 
paragraph in 2002. This paragraph contained increased penal sanctions for killings with 
intentions of terrorism, forbade financing and illegalized to plan terrorist attacks. The second 
package of reforms arrived in 2005. The new laws gave secret services more freedom of 
supervision, illustrated by the repeal of the prohibition of surveillance. The last package pre-
2012 came in 2008. These latter reforms prohibited recruitment to terrorist organizations, as 
well as training and encouragement of terrorist acts (Færaas, 2013: a).  
To illustrate how the former laws lacked these various implementations, we can observe the 
definition of law nr.10 of 20.03.1998 on “preventive national security” §3,5: 
“Illegal use of, or threats of the use of, coercion or violence against persons or property, in the attempt 
to pressure the national authorities or population or the society otherwise to achieve political, religious 
or ideological goals” (Bergesen, 2012: 53) 
In reality, Norway implemented the new legislation because there was a demand from the 
international community to increase anti-terror cooperation through legislative homogeneity. 
The national assertions of terrorist threats at the time did not expect any imminent attack on 
national soil (Engene, 2013: 253). This is reflected by the foreign policy strategies against 
international terrorism developed by the Norwegian foreign ministry in 2006:   
“So far, we have been spared acts of terrorism on Norwegian soil. Nevertheless, Norway and Norwegian 
interests are threatened by international terrorism. A fundamental principle of Norwegian foreign policy 
is to strengthen the role of the UN” (Utenriksdepartementet, 2006: 7) 
How are the reforms of counter-terror laws limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal 
Reciprocal Radicalization between PU and NDL compared to the 1990s/early 2000s? One 
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explanation is the activities of the neo-Nazis and anti-racists never were perceived as terrorist, 
which allowed the groups to keep more of its mobilization potential but also facilitated tactical 
innovations and escalations of violence in group-conflicts. The first Norwegian verdict of 
terrorism occurred as late as 2012, when two males were convicted for planning a terrorist 
attack against the newspaper that printer the caricatures of Muhammed (NTB & Løvstad, 2012; 
Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 59).  
However, there has been more convictions of terrorism after 2012. A substantial number of 
these cases contain individuals who were profiled members of the Norwegian radical Islamist 
movement (Christoffersen & Zaman, 2016) like Ubaydullah Hussain’s conviction in April 2017 
for recruitment to the Islamic State (Arntsen & Hopperstad, 2017); or being active in the Syrian 
conflict, like Ishaq Ahmed, who was sentenced to 8 years in prison (Holm-Nilsen & Sagmoen, 
2015). Certain incidents in the 90s would have been qualified as terrorism with the 
specifications of types of actions in the new juridical reforms. This is especially the case with 
the escalation of violence after 1994/1995. Neo-Nazi-made bombs detonated in 1995 and 1996 
at the Blitz house in Oslo (Fangen, 2001: 236). The racist murder of Benjamin Hermansen in 
2001 could also have been interpreted as an act with “intention of causing serious fear in the 
population” according to the current legislation on terrorism (Straffeloven, Kap.18 §131 b).  
Ultimately, the juridical perception of terrorism has been a political question. Before 2001, the 
state would rather define radical action as ordinary legal breaches over terrorism. Vandalism, 
explosion, or criminality were common designations used by officials (Jore, 2011). The latter 
became the verdict of the 19-year-old Norwegian Ole Kristian Brastad, who tried to place a 
bomb in the Nordmoské in Oslo in 1985. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison (Strømmen, 
2011), while his four accomplices were not charged; collaboration for terrorism became 
criminalized in 2002 (Færaas, 2013: a). This act was clearly politically motivated and targeted 
against civilian targets with a specific religious background. According to the new laws on 
terrorism, financing, preparation, training and collaboration are terrorist offences.  
If the today’s reforms on terrorism had been implemented in the 1990s, it could have had 
important consequences for the total number active of members within the radical fractions, 
and ultimately for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between the groups within the two 
social movements. Strict legislation discourages the use of radicalism, which was essential for 
in-group cohesion as well as the identification of an enemy out-group in neo-Nazis and anti-
racists conflicts. Thus, before 2001, groups had more freedom to use violence in conflicts with 
out-groups than after 2012-2014; legislation was limiting for HRR in the second case, 
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facilitating in the first case. The Norwegian Defence League’s narrative was most likely 
moderated by a stricter regulation of racial discriminatory rhetoric, and Profetens Ummah lost 
a significant part of its mobilization and leadership due reforms of legislation of terrorism.   
 
4.3.2 Training of agencies 
In the last section, the thesis argues that post-2001 reforms of legislation was limiting for 
Horizontal Reciprocal in the second case due to two factors: reforms of laws on racial 
discrimination and terrorism. However, international security statuses post-2001 changed 
drastically: nations in the West observed that radicalization and terrorism did not stem 
exclusively from individuals from nations outside of the region, but there was also a growing 
domestic problem of “homegrown terrorism”. Attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), 
Norway (2011), Paris (2015) and Orlando (2016) are examples of the numerous orchestrated 
attacks by individuals with the same nationalities that the country they attacked. Eventually, 
National governments were forced to train agencies to prevent homegrown radicalization and 
terrorism, and especially to tackle the new threat of radical Islamism.   
 
EXIT, the Action Plan and empowerment conversations  
The first project against radicalization was implemented in Norway in 1997, and was named 
“Project EXIT”. As shown in previous parts, the preventive effects of legislation gave the 
groups the freedom to pursue a high level of inter-group activity over longer periods in time. In 
1995, 80 radical-right individuals were arrested in Torshov (Oslo). The accumulation of past 
incidents (Brumunddal 1991, Vennesla 1992-1993, etc) started a process of cooperation 
between the police and researchers to develop a preventive strategy against radicalization in 
Norwegian cities like Oslo, Drammen, and Kristiansand. The project was first initiated in 1997 
by the organization “Voksne for Unge i Norge” and focused primarily on reducing neo-Nazi 
activity and recruitment as well as encouraging disengagement (EXIT-Sluttrapport: 2-5; Vidino 
& Brandon, 2012: 60-61).  
In 2014, the Norwegian government initiated a second large-scale project against 
“radicalization and violent extremism”, called Handlingplanen (Action Plan). This was a 
revisited version of the first issue that was initially developed in 2010. The international threat 
of radicalization and terrorism security had gradually become a domestic problem after 2010, 
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with terrorist attacks and multiple active radical groups from both radical Islamic- and radical-
right movements. New actors and changing security statuses required alternative measures to 
counter the growing national and global danger. The Action Plan was primarily designed to 
counter the relatively unknown threat of radical Islamism (NOU, 2014; Vidino & Brandon, 
2012: IBID). 
In retrospect, the EXIT-strategy was quite successful. The first reason for this was that the 
conflicts in the 1990s were mainly between youth under 18 years of age, therefore more 
manageable than groups consisting primarily of adults. It became particularly efficient with 
empowerment conversations (bekymringssamtale), which identifies (intentions of) criminal 
behavior and directs the concerned individual onto a path of legal and permissible conduct 
(Politidirektoratet, 2011: 13). Teachers, police officers, council workers or religious leaders are 
usually leading these conversations (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 63). 
The cooperation between radicalized youth, their parents, and public employees was one of the 
main strategies of prevention, disengagement, guidance and rehabilitation. The second reason 
for EXIT’s success was due to the transparency of the Norwegian society. The neo-Nazis’ 
numbers of participants peaked at 300 at the national scale, but they regionally fragmented and 
easily detectable due to small populations in Norwegian cities with the highest levels of group-
activity (Rieker et al, 2006: 16-17).  
Despite EXIT’s positive results, the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s still experienced 
severe instances of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. One explanation is simply that there 
was no efficient system of prevention before 1997. This is per definition a facilitating political 
opportunity structure for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization because it enables contact, 
which Della Porta argues, is necessary to activate mechanisms of radicalization (Della Porta, 
2012: 246). Yngve Carlsson argued that the escalation of conflicts was in early stages a result 
of the inability of municipalities to face the new challenges of radicalization. He mentioned 
lacks of competence, misjudged or exaggerated reactions due to incorrect diagnosis of the 
source of the problem and refusing to hold entire communities responsible for the actions of the 
radical groups that reside within them (Rieker et al, 2006: 17-19).  
Prevention of radicalization after 2001 built on the EXIT-project in two ways. First, the Action 
Plan and other post-2011 measures against radicalization were inspired by highly successful 
strategies of counter-radicalization. Tore Bjørgo saw that many of the successful factors from 
the 90s were transmittable in the modern era, with certain modifications (Letvik et al, 2012). 
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Much like the EXIT-project, the Action Plan also acknowledges the importance of police 
cooperation with communal authorities on subject like criminality and drug abuse (Justis- & 
Beredskapsdepartementet, 2014: 13). After 2006, empowerment conversations were used to 
tackle radical Islamism (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 62). New communal initiatives were also 
initiated, like Samordning av lokale rus og kriminalitetsforebyggende tiltak. The SLT-model 
works on the prevention of criminality and drug abuse with minors, and consists of a 
cooperation between the police, communes and organizations/businesses (Kompetansesenteret 
for Kriminalitetsforebygging, undated) 
Second, the preventative work against radicalization of the 90s continued after the turn of the 
millennia, and it neutralized major parts of the radical-right movement in the country. Vidino 
and Brandon regard it as “highly successful” (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 61). For example, an 
important point is that the Action Plan was initiated in 2014, which is at the late stages of NDL’s 
and PU’s existence. Still, before 2014, there were multiple functioning and efficient measures 
against radicalization. Inter-communal cooperation (SLT) and empowerment conversations has 
been primarily developed for individuals under 18 years old, making it very difficult for a minor 
to display signs of radicalization without early interventions. This lowered the number of 
radicalized individuals and thus reduced general recruitment of minors to radical groups. 
Therefore, the EXIT-project continued to have an effect well after the last active radical youth-
groups.  
The latter explains why Profetens Ummah and (especially) the NDL struggled to mobilize the 
specific demographic cohort; early counter-radicalization intervention of younger individuals 
prevents recruitment and is ultimately a limiting factor for Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization. Fewer members in radical groups means that authorities can control the 
activities of nearly all individuals, reducing the possibility for an unknown sub-group or lone-
wolf like A.B.B acting from ideological outskirts. According to Aftenposten (2014), the 
majority of the members of Profetens Ummah were over 20 years old (Stokke et al, 2014). 
PST’s mapping of demographic traits of people that frequent radical Islamic group reveals an 
average age of 27, 5 years (PST, 2016 b: 6). 
A general tendency is that older members have fewer incentives to live a radical life than 
youngsters do. The first reason is push factors, or negative social forces like stricter 
punishments by legislation for adults than for minors; for example, the risk of longer 
incarceration is greater after the age of 18 (Prosjekt EXIT – undated: 12-13). The post-2001 
reforms of legislation have ultimately been increasing push-factors themselves. The second 
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reason is pull-factors, which are positive alternative lifestyles that could lead and individual out 
of the environment. An older individual does not have the same need for excitement and will 
eventually want to live a normal life with commitments to family and professional life (Prosject 
EXIT – Undated: 13-14).  
Despite the incorporation of successful measures of EXIT into the Action Plan, the new 
counter-radicalization policies suffered from challenges in the new context. First, the 
cooperation between different instances like NAV, SLT communes and local actors have 
proven to be difficult.  Second, empowerment conversations are not as efficient with adults as 
with minors. This is because of parents’ involvement in the process of rehabilitation with the 
latter, which has had a very positive effect. On the contrary, prevention of the radicalization of 
radical Islamists proved to be much more difficult due general lack of knowledge on how to 
tackle the theological aspects. For example, a “normal” police officer in the EXIT project 
discussed prospect on the mere quality of life, but had no relevant insight in religious “rights” 
or “wrongs” (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 64-65; Kvittingen, 2016; Lid et al, 2016).  
In retrospect, the EXIT project was probably more successful than the Action Plan. This is why 
the most significant difference of opportunity structures for radicalization between the cases is 
that the first case had no established preventative measures (against specifically radicalization) 
before 1997. The Action Plan might be less successful than EXIT, but the measures from the 
1990s/2000s like empowerment conversations and police-communal cooperation still became 
common tools of prevention against radicalization in the following years. The results were the 
collapse of the radical right scene in Norway and higher transparency; thus lower levels of 
detectable radicalization.  
 
Aggressive security services 
In the legislative discussion, the thesis discussed reforms of laws against terrorism. One change 
that was did not get evoked was the increased freedom of surveillance and wiretapping from 
the reforms of 2005 (Færaas, 2013: a). This liberty to acquire information had major 
consequences for security agencies and general police work in Norway. The 01.01.2002, the 
Police Surveillance Service (Politiets Overvåkningstjeneste) was re-organized and changed 
name to the Police Security Service (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste). This change came parallel to 
a ratification of a reform of the police law from 1995 (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2007: 32). 
After the arrival of radical Islamist groups in Norway, scholars observed that the security 
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services had initiated quite aggressive strategies against the milieu to reduce its activities and 
further recruitment (Svendsen & Døvik, 2016; Akerhaug, 2013: 60-61). This section discusses 
the implications of the new characteristics of the police security agency across the two cases.  
As the thesis has shown, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had political and juridical consequences in 
Norway. The global threat of radical Islamism did also influence the structure and strategies of 
security service, which underwent two important changes. After 2002, PST devoted much of 
its attention towards ideologically motivated violence inspired by radical Islamism (Døvik & 
Wernesen, 2014); combatting international terrorism was given the highest priority (NOU, 
2002). There was a real shift of focus from POT, which had similar tasks as PST but was active 
in a “pre-9/11” context.  
As shown in the part on legislation, a second big change came when the counter-terrorism 
reforms allowed security services extensive freedom of surveillance by removing covert audio 
surveillance and extending wiretapping to a wider range of crimes (Færaas, 2013: a). In 1996, 
POT got accused by the Lund-Commission of illegal surveillance and information gathering of 
Norwegian communists. The first signs of the increased freedom of monitoring came with a 
new proposition from the Danielsen-commission in 1998, which suggested that the institution 
should be an independent organ of the police and questioned the current conditions of the legal 
framework on surveillance (Ot.prp. nr. 29, 2000-2001: 1; NOU, 2012: 11). In 2002, POT finally 
became PST.  
The new laws against terrorism and increased liberty of surveillance gave PST the possibility 
to lead proactive policies against individuals who they believe threaten national security and 
interests. Members of the groups in the 1990 were mainly in contact with normal police officers, 
mostly because no sub-group within the movements were perceived as threats against national 
interests. In the contemporary case, both Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League 
suffered from the security agency’s activities. 
The Norwegian Defence League was primarily an internet phenomenon. The group struggled 
to establish itself in Norway due to ideological illegitimacy, long term-prevention of 
radicalization and legislation against discrimination and terrorism. The group probably never 
passed its infant stage, and another reason for this is PST’s total control of NDL. The method 
the agency used to monitor the group’s every move was through infiltration.  
In 2013, Christian Høibø came out as a long-term infiltrator in different radical milieus in 
Norway, with one of them being the Norwegian Defence League. Høibø was part of a group of 
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administrators who managed the group from 2010-2012, and reported to PST and SOS-rasisme. 
Høibø did later reveal his past as a spy in a documentary (NRK-Brennpunkt, 2013), and stated 
that he was partly responsible for the groups’ establishment (Flydal, 2013). Over longer periods, 
the spy reported in information about members of NDL, and personally states he banned Anders 
Behring Breivik from the group due to his violent, anti-Muslim intentions (Mon, 2013).  
Ultimately, it seems like Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste had large control over the small and 
fragmented radical-right group in Norway in 2010 and 2011. The agency’s estimations in 
security assessments from these years indicate a weak radical right movement in Norway 
(Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2010; Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2011). The infiltration of the 
NDL gave security agencies the liberty to monitor an important actor of the radical right 
environment in the country, and since the NDL had close relations to the “English Defence 
League” and SIAN (Stop Islamiseringen av Norge) it would facilitate the mapping of a large 
radical-right network, both within the nation frontiers and intentionally. In reality, it would be 
very hard for the NDL to act collectively without reactions from PST or SOS-Rasisme. One 
example of this is the NDL-manifestation of 2011, where infiltrators from SOS-Rasisme 
suggested the specific place where it eventually would unfold. It was then easy to assemble a 
counter-demonstration, which further reduced the legitimacy of NDL’s message (Sandli et al, 
2012).  
Ultimately, security agencies had almost full control over every move within the NDL, except 
for an unexpected lone-wolf actor. Despite the 22.7.2011 terrorism, it was rational of PST to 
keep NDL active along with informants within the group. An active NDL means that security 
agencies had a way to unite individuals considered as ideologically problematic through very 
transparent radical groups. The almost total control of the Norwegian Defence League made it 
even harder for the group to be active, recruit and grow. This factor is most certainly limiting 
for mechanisms of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between the NDL and Profetens 
Ummah.  
In Norsk Jihad (2013), Lars Akerhaug gives valuable insight in how PST was interacting with 
the radical Islamists movement in Norway. Much like with the NDL, the security service had 
informants in the milieu to extract a maximum amount of information about certain individuals, 
like Mohyeldeen Mohammad (Akerhaug, 2013: 52). Already in 2009, PST performed 
empowerment conversations against several persons considered radicalized and maintained 
regular contact with them. After a two-year long investigation started in 2011, an appointed 
committee from Stortinget revealed that the agency had illegally monitored and registered 
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information about approximately 300 individuals from radical Islamist milieus in the 1990s and 
2000s (Færaas, 2013: b). Lastly, Akerhaug also describes how PST intercepted people how 
wanted to join the Syrian conflict at the airport, before they got a chance to leave to national 
frontiers (Akerhaug, 2013: 56-58).  
What this highlights is the pro-active policy of Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste. The intelligence 
services were already leading extensive measures in the early 2000s, but Akerhaug states that 
PST started intensely working against radical Islamism after 2012. In 2010, the agency had an 
overview of practically every single person within the movement, due to a demonstration in 
front of the American embassy against the Mohammed caricatures where 3000 participated 
(Akerhaug, 2013: 62). PST maintained close contact with the local police, and local agents were 
often in charge of leading the communication between the parties (Akerhaug, 2013: 60). Given 
that the group had threatened Norwegian officials and supported groups like Al-Quaeda and the 
Islamic State, it was considered to have terrorist intentions and was taken extremely seriously.  
Most of PST’s contact with individuals they considered potentially dangerous consisted of 
preventive work, much like the EXIT project. They continued using empowerment 
conversations, and experienced that they were more efficient with younger individuals who 
recently got into the environment, for the more radicalized these actions could reinforce their 
view of an oppressive Norwegian state (Akerhaug, 2013: 60-62).  
Even though older and more radicalized individuals do not necessarily respond positively to 
empowerment conversations, they have been gradually neutralized during the years after 2009. 
Ever since 2001, the Norwegian security agency viewed radical Islamism as the most important 
threat against Norway’s security. One primary goal was to crush the radical networks in the 
country, an objective that former PU-member Yousef Assidiq saw as quite successful (Svensen 
& Døvik, 2016).  
In 2016, there had been nine indictments for breaking the laws against terrorism and other forms 
of criminality. One important objective of PST was to neutralize the leadership of the group, 
which they did through e.g. incarcerations (Ubaydullah Hussain – 2017; Arfan Bhatti – 2006, 
2008, 2013, 2017; Mohyeldeen Mohammad - 2013) and expulsions (Omar Cheblal - 2014, 
Adnan Shaluli – 2016) (Christoffersen & Zaman, 2016; Zaman & Christoffersen, 2016; Arntsen 
et al, 2015; Holm-Nilsen & Falch-Olsen, 2013).  
As mentioned previously in the thesis, police forces experienced that preventive conversations 
were quite inefficient against older radicalized Islamists. This was especially the case for those 
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who had already decided to join the Syrian conflict. However, their departure weakened 
Profetens Ummah’s strength at home, as many as 18 had were estimated dead in 2016 
(Svendsen & Døvik, 2016). During 2012-2016, PST was actively trying to prevent recruitment 
and activity from the Islamists fractions in Norway, but departures to Syria were also quite 
limiting for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization with the Norwegian Defence League. The 
NDL would have less of an incentive to consider PU as a main contributor to the “Islamization” 
of Norway and Europe if the primary objective of many of PU’s members was to join the 
conflict in the Middle East.  
In sum, the counter-measures of PST were quite limiting for the unilateral activities and 
recruitment of Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League. Weakening the groups 
impedes their radicalization and renders inter-group interactions very unlikely. Infiltration was 
important to gain control over the radical-right- and radical Islamic movements, but PST did 
also use other methods. In 2011, a meeting took place with NDL leaders in a hotel in Oslo, 
where Høibø recorded the conversation and reported it back to PST (NRK-Brennpunkt, 2013). 
The new reforms of the laws against terrorism gave the security service the chance to monitor 
activity in new ways. The large control over the Norwegian Defence League leadership, and 
the monitoring, incarcerations and regular contact with individuals within the radical Islamists 
movement significantly weakened both sides, limiting Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.   
 
4.3.3 Engagement of Civil Society 
So far, the analysis indicates a general shift from facilitating towards limiting opportunity 
structures of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization from the first to the second case. One 
hypothesis is that the engagement of civil society did also limit HRR more in the second case 
than in the 1990s/2000s.  
What does a more active civil society signify for opportunity structures? If local communities 
have efficient ways of combatting radicalization, it is then limiting. Multiplying measures does 
not necessarily mean better results. The thesis has discussed the role of the EXIT-project and 
Action Plan from a police-perspective through empowerment conversations, but these 
initiatives are first and foremost cooperative measures where local communities have an 
important role in the prevention of radicalization. This section analyzes counter-radicalization 
at the grassroot-level across the two cases.  
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Vidino and Brandon view the EXIT-project as highly successful (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 61). 
Others question the effects of the Action Plan, partly because Norwegian communities have 
displayed lower levels of competence in tackling radicalization and Islamism. Norwegian 
prevention of radicalization has been primarily directed towards rehabilitation and social 
cooperation. For example, one successful local initiative in the 90s and 2000s was the offering 
of jobs to youth who wished to disengage from the radical environment. As Katrine Fangen 
argued, the system focused on integration as an alternative strategy (Fangen, 2001 b: 34-35).   
There is major ideological different between the cases that makes the rehabilitation in the first 
period a much smoother process than for radicalized individuals in 2012-2014. When Bjørgo, 
Fangen and others analyzed why some of the youths were drawn into the radical milieus, the 
ideological component was but one of many reasons. “There are few that seek the environment 
out of pure ideological reasons” (Fangen, 2001: 134). In many instances, the individuals were 
not ideologically motivated, and did not identify with the neo-Nazi ideas that defined the 
movement. For example, while Boot Boys was rather violent, the group did not figure as an 
ideologically driven organization. On the contrary, Vigrid promoted anti-Semitism but 
distanced itself from violence (Bjørgo, 2005: 50).  
Most individuals within the movements in the 90s/2000s did not reach high levels of ideological 
radicalization, and were therefore more prone to an easier rehabilitation into society. This was 
a significant problem for many radicalized individuals in the second case, especially for 
Profetens Ummah. Many members displayed high levels of ideological conviction, and were 
thus very hard to de-radicalize. The 30th October 2014, Erna Solberg ordered 23 municipalities 
to take actions against radicalization due to the increasing number of Norwegian foreign 
fighters, but no one really had any specific competence to tackle the problem of Islamism and 
radicalization (Thjømøe, 2015).  
Radicalization is a dynamic process that the scientific community still struggles to fully 
understand. In the first case, the measures where more about tackling unwanted criminal 
behavior than to reverse ideological indoctrination, and it isn’t shocking that local mobilization 
had such great counter-effects. In some communities, the initiatives of normal, unqualified 
people were more efficient than direct engagement by police employees. In Bøler (Oslo), the 
social initiative called “Trygg Bydel” was carried out by locals and stopped recruitment to the 
neo-Nazi group that resided in the area through offers of alternative social activities from the 
trouble members (NTB, 2001; Lie, 2002).  
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The EXIT-strategy was launched in 1997, a significant amount of time after the first instances 
of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between the two movements. It is now three years since 
the Action Plan was initiated (NOU: 2014), and there is still much to learn on how to tackle the 
new forms of radicalization. Regarding Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League, 
new legislation on terrorism and more aggressive security agencies were probably more 
preventive than a little developed plan of prevention, which also came as late as 2014.  
Ultimately, the local initiatives in the second case were “more” facilitating opportunity 
structures for unilateral radicalization than the EXIT-strategy. The two cases display two very 
different contexts that need different forms of measures. In the first case, the more efficient 
initiatives were social programs. In the second case, the more efficient policies against 
radicalization requires deeper ideological knowledge but also more time. The rehabilitation of 
radical Islamists and generally older individuals located within the two extremities is 
increasingly harder than with minors, but we also need to give the measures more time before 
they can become efficient. An example of the negative professional consequences for adults 
who belong in these types of groups is the leader of Norwegian Pegida group, Marx Hermansen, 
who was let go as a teacher at a high school after an interview with the media channel TV2 in 
2016 (Jensen & Husebø-Evensen, 2016) 
Nevertheless, the comparative failure or success of local initiatives across the cases is 
unimportant. The collective effect of legislation and preventive/active strategies of Norwegian 
security agencies were so significant that the thesis can conclude than counter-radicalization 
measures were more limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization 
in the second case. Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League had no chance to 
grow, mobilize or recruit in early stages of their mobilization. The groups weakened so quickly 
that they were unable to form radical fractions, interact with each other or develop inter-group 
dynamics if the ideological component would have been a facilitating structure. Without 
unilateral growth, different counter-measures will incapacitate radical groups and mechanisms 
of inter-group radicalization.   
 
4.3.4. Hypothesis 2 - Counter-Radicalization as a structural opportunity 
How did counter-radicalization measures function as opportunity structures from the first case 
to the second? The three chosen indicators of this independent variable clearly demonstrate that 
counter-radicalization measure was a limiting opportunity structure for Horizontal Reciprocal 
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Radicalization in the second case, while facilitating in the first. Therefore, the thesis confirms 
the second hypothesis (H2). First, the reforms law §135a against discrimination and racial 
prejudices was a significant obstacle against free speech. Pre-reforms, the groups in the 1990s 
could express themselves more freely without juridical consequences, like Sørlie’s public 
appeal in 2000.  
Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had a crucial impact on anti-terror laws, which post-2001 
gradually incorporated a wider spectrum of acts related to terrorism, like financing or 
compliance. Different actions of radicalism in the 1980s and 1990s were not labeled as 
terrorism. Had modern laws on terrorism been active in the 1990s, it would have had significant 
consequences on general prevention as well as incarcerations. This could have been detrimental 
for the degree of radicalism and recruitment between neo-Nazis and anti-racists; the new case 
shows that Profetens Ummah was quite weakened from the new reforms, ultimately reducing 
the risk of HRR.  
Third, the thesis finds that there was no efficient plan against radicalization before 1997. This 
naturally gives the groups the liberty to grow, facilitating unilateral radicalization, inter-group 
contact and then bilateral dynamics of radicalization. The Action Plan is still young, but so far, 
it has been unable to tackle the new problem of ideological radicalization in the degree of the 
preventive measures of the EXIT-plan. Still, the latter benefits from successful tools of the 
former counter-radicalization strategy, like empowerment conversations and the general effects 
of prevention. The aggressive strategies and liberties of security agencies post-2002 did also 
act as limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, because PU and 
NDL were controlled/weakened by infiltration, systematic contact with PST and 
incarcerations/expulsions of central leaders/members. The unilateral effects have direct 
consequences on bilateral mechanisms of radicalization.  
Fourth, the thesis concludes that the engagement of civil society was more efficient in the first 
case than the second, but it is important to understand that there was a higher need for specific 
ideological knowledge in the second case, thus local communities were in reality unqualified 
to be of help. Ultimately, this finding has no significant consequence on competition across the 
two cases. The collective effect of the three indicators of the independent variable strongly 
support the conclusion that the political opportunity structures in the second case limited 





So far, the analysis has demonstrated how ideologies and counter-radicalization measures can 
work as limiting or facilitating opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. 
The next section turns to competition, a factor that McCauley and Moskalenko argue is 
important for in-group cohesion, and ultimately radicalization at the group-level (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008: 424-426). The thesis expects a positive effect of competition on HRR-
mechanisms, and given the different outcomes, higher levels of competition in the 1990s 
between the movements/groups than between Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence 
League.  
 
4.4.1. Geographical interactions  
One of the main reasons for the long duration and escalation of conflicts in the 90s/2000s was 
the contestation of local geographical areas. In the first period, the groups lived quite close to 
each other, often in the same town. This forced the poles to compete for the same social 
resources, as many of the members were living alongside one another. For once, there was 
competition over social goods, like girls, status, reputation and power. In Kristiansand, the 
center of town became the spot of assembly, contested between youth with minority-
backgrounds and neo-Nazis. The areas in question were often pubs or youth-clubs (Bjørgo et 
al, 2001: 122).  
One reason that people wanted to join the different sides was that they sought security. 
Vulnerable youth who had been harassed by “immigrants” were often prone to join the neo-
Nazi movement (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 70). On the other end, neo-Nazis did sometimes attack or 
provoke people with a different skin color, which gave the victims a grievance to join the anti-
racist fraction (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 73). When groups guarantee security and solidarity, they 
automatically put themselves in a position where they have to use strategies of active response. 
If one part uses violence, then the reply if first and foremost by the same nature. The primary 
reason for this is that these groups had low levels of trust with the police (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 
103-107); instead of seeking help from law enforcement, they took the matter into their own 
hands.  
The co-existence of polarized groups in small geographic areas facilitated acts of revenge 
against former assailants. Not only did this mobilize members of both parties, but it also limited 
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disengagement. Since members of both sides knew each other, they did not forget assaults done 
by people who had left the environment. Many had personal enemies, who they regularly 
threatened. Once they left the milieu, defector could be targets of personal revenge (Bjørgo. 
2001: 74-79). The co-existence in small spaces therefore gave some individuals less incentives 
to disengage, and former experiences pre-developed hostilities for the counter-group. This 
naturally reinforced polarization and radicalization processes because members were active in 
the inter-group conflicts over long periods, ultimately facilitated Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization.  
Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League did not co-exist in small areas like 
several groups in Kristiansand and Oslo in the first case. Most members who joined these 
groups lived in different places and had negative experiences that were unconnected to 
members of the out-group. The lower level of co-existence reduced the risk of general contact, 
as the members did not know each other personally as in many cities in the 90s/2000s. Still, 
individuals or groups from different cities/nations can end up in physical confrontations. In 
Britain, clashes between the EDL and Islamists did sometimes escalate when they found 
themselves against each other in demonstrations. It was the primary setting from which inter-
group violence could develop (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013). 
The latter was the form of political mobilization that produced the most inter-group radicalism, 
often by escalations of clandestine political violence. In Norway, a few manifestations were 
initiated by each side, but without the direct counter-mobilization of the counterpart. For 
example, in the demonstration of December 2012, the police forced Profetens Ummah (and a 
counter-demonstration from moderate third-party actors) to keep a significant distance from the 
Norwegian Defence League (Gunnersen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012). This blocked any possible 
physical interactions between them.  
In reality, the Norwegian Defence League had trouble mobilizing for its own events, and they 
often ended with low numbers of participants. It is improbable that they could have ever 
significantly mobilized against the activities of Profetens Ummah. Any physical interaction 
between PU and NDL was prevented by police forces, who kept the groups under control in 
different locations (Gunnersen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012). Both groups, but especially NDL, 
were so small in number of members and so little prone to street-violence that counter-
manifestations would have had little impact on the HRR-process.  
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An important change of the political opportunity structures between the two periods is that the 
groups in the second case could benefit from the internet and social media. In contrast to the 
first period, early stages of HRR (molding of in-group identification and out-group alienation) 
could have started in this arena. Brynjar Lia observed that Facebook was important for 
Profetens Ummah self-identification (Lia, 2013: 106-108). Contact triggers mechanisms of 
radicalization (Della Porta, 2012), but a necessary discussion is whether the online arena has 
become a point of contention with similar radicalizing effects than local co-existence.  
Ultimately, the laws against online-discrimination and terrorism did limit the escalation of inter-
group conflict online, as unilateral freedom of activism was blocked by legislation. If state 
agencies set strict restrictions on physical interactions, then a general freedom on the internet 
could replace the effect of social/strategic competition. However, if the internet has indeed 
become the arena for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, then the groups have to be able to 
operate with a large degree of freedom; restrictions on hate/discriminatory speeches blocks 
direct contact or indirect use of one’s statements for propaganda.    
 
4.4.2. Recruitment 
A recurrent phenomenon in the 90s/2000s was that members could switch from one pole to the 
other, and sometimes even back again (Bjørgo, 2005: 64). In Xtrm, Jan Kallevik speaks about 
how a leader of a neo-Nazi subgroup, Jonny Olsen, tried to recruit him to his side despite the 
fact that the former was part of an enemy group. He was also highly profiled in the anti-racist 
movement (Kallevik, 2013: 198-199). The two-way exchange of supporters increased 
polarization and feelings of hostility. The deserters were regarded as traitors and lead to 
personal feuds with former friends/affiliates from the other side. Not only was revenge personal, 
but if other members of the group attacked these individuals it had consequences for collective 
feelings of hostility towards the assailant group. It also worked as a self-legitimization of 
violence (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 90). Solidarity turned individual conflicts into collective disputes, 
reinforcing mechanisms of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.  
The second case is quite different from the first in two ways. First, recruitment wasn’t primarily 
local, people from different places in the country gathered to rally for the same cause which 
lowered in-group cohesion in comparison to the first case. In 2015, the journalist Erlend Arntsen 
mapped the profile of the individuals who had departed from Norway to the Islamic State. 
Affiliates of the radical Islamist movement mobilized for the same ideological cause despite 
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the fact that they came from different places in the country, thus there was no pre-existing 
solidarity between them other than the (required) radical Islamic belief. There was also 
significant age differences between them. A 28-year-old converted woman from Trønderlag 
would hardly have had the same life experiences than a 23-year-old Muslim man from 
Fredrikstad (Arntsen, 2015).  
Second, Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League focused on quite different 
demographic groups for recruitment. This naturally lowered the levels of inter-group 
competition. The NDL regarded the Christian community as a potential ally, as they believed 
that they could mobilize and cooperate with Kristent Samlingsparti and the Christian factions 
within Stop Islamiseringen av Norge (SIAN) (Rognsvåg, 2012: b). In contrast to the NDL, one 
of the main goals of Profetens Ummah was to recruit young Muslims, especially in the Oslo-
area. They were notably quite active in Grønland and Oslo S, two geographical zones in the 
capital where there are a higher number of foreigners and Muslims than the rest of the 
city/country (NTB, 2013: b).  
The radical-right group did also dedicate some of its attention on recruitment within the 
hooligan environment. A former chief of security from the Norwegian football team Vålerenga 
stated that NDL tried to recruit young and inexperienced males from the supporter club 
“Klanen”, much like Boot Boys did in the 1990s (Schjønberg et al, 2013). NDL’s intentions of 
recruiting from the hooligan environment also became apparent when members of the 
supporter-group “Brannguttene” were added in the NDL Facebook-group without their 
personal consent (Opheim, 2012).  
In many ways, the NDL and PU recruitment strategies were quite similar. The easiest targets to 
radicalize were vulnerable youngsters, looking for excitement and social approval. In contrast 
to the NDL, Profetens Ummah understood that the individuals who wanted their ideological 
ideals were Muslims. This is why another specific strategy of PU was to recruit inside of 
mosques. Individuals from this environment were inclined to be attracted by the various forms 
of excitement connected Islamic state. They would also be more grieved by Muslim oppression 
by state actors than the small radical-right in Norway. PU and NDL were not in competition for 
the same base of support, something that in itself gave the counterpart less incentive to care 
about the other, but did also reinforce the unilateral grievances behind the recruitment in the 
first place. The analysis of the ideological nuances shows that these were never symmetrical 
like between the groups in the first case.   
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4.4.3 Ideological competition 
Roger Eatwell, Majid Nawaz, and Bartlett & Birdwell are amongst those who have discussed 
the relationship between counter-jihadism and radical Islamism in Britain (Eatwell, 2006; 
Nawaz, 2011; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). However, what is an ideological symbiosis? In the 
British case, Bartlett and Birdwell argue that EDL demonstrations act a as “recruiting sergeant” 
for radical Islamists fractions. In reality, the group started up as a reaction to planned protests 
by Al Mujahiroun (2009). Are radical groups with these specific ideologies (context-
independently) prone to engage in reactionary interactions? The authors refrain from giving a 
positive answer. One possible explanation was specific circumstances in Luton, or even factors 
caused by the national context. They mention an observable increased radical-right online 
activism in the period, and a significant number of British radical Islamist demonstrations 
against symbolic events. In any case, radical Islamist networks were perceived as a direct threat 
to people in the British community (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013).  
The inter-group relationship in the Norwegian “sister-case” is quite difficult to identify. 
However, one conclusion is that Profentens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League lacked 
the specific circumstances that trigged HRR in Britain as well as between neo-Nazis and anti-
racists in Norway. In the 1990s/2000s, the radical fractions displays strong signs of ideological 
interdependence. As the thesis shows in the ideological discussion, the group-identities were 
almost entirely sustained by the counterpart at a certain point in time. Their primary driver was 
the elimination of a specific enemy, a strategy that molded mechanisms of polarization, 
conflicts and reciprocal tactical innovations. In reality, there was a real ideological competition 
for survival, but eliminating the enemies would render unilateral collective identities obsolete.  
Ultimately, this is a contradictory logic if the groups were entirely ideologically driven. What 
it was really about in the first case was social competition over success in common life within 
the same remote areas, which gradually shaped encompassing ideological structures. When the 
threat becomes real and it negatively influences personal welfare in one’s closest social circles, 
dualism rationalizes a combat against the enemy by any means necessary. One possible strategy 
is through collective mobilization. At a certain point, existential competition becomes a reality.  
In the second case, the number of actors involved in the group-perceptions of oppression were 
much more than just Profetens Ummah or the Norwegian Defence League. The reality that 
formed their ideological grievances was far more complex/global than the local/regional lens 
which dominated in the first case. In an NDL-perspective, Profetens Ummah was far from being 
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the only “force of Islamization” of Norway. In reality, they never really specify which actors 
are behind the process. One major strategical obstacle are the reforms on the law against 
discrimination, or §135a. In a PU-perspective, the NDL was but one minor problem in a sea of 
actors against Muslim oppression. Laws against discrimination were also equally relevant from 
them as they were for the NDL. In sum, was it ever rational to engage in direct competition for 
survival with the counter-group? The thesis views radicals as rational actors with political 
strategies, dependent on the opportunity structures in societies in which they exist. We can then 
hardly conclude anything other than no.  
There were other dominating grievances at play, and without a clear reciprocal dynamics. The 
very first dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization (polarization, interactions) were 
improbable in the second case from the very beginning. The most dominant driver of each 
fraction, their ideologies, were ultimately the only possible arena where inter-group 
radicalization could have emerged. As we analyze the beliefs of Profetens Ummah and 
Norwegian Defence League, other priorities were clearly dominating their political agendas.  
 
4.4.4. Hypothesis 3 – Inter-group competition as a structural opportunity 
The last section has investigated inter-group competition as an opportunity structure for 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization across the two selected cases. The three chosen indicators 
of the independent variable show that competition facilitated HRR in the first case, while a lack 
of competition in the second case had a limiting effect on the same phenomenon. Therefore, the 
thesis confirms hypothesis 3, H3.  
First, neo-Nazi and anti-racist factions often competed over social resources in remote 
geographical areas. Competition over girls, status and city centers increased in-group cohesion 
and out-group hostility. Since the members of the groups often knew each other personally, 
there were often retaliation and vengeance. In the end, people were drawn to different sides 
because they could give them security from further harassment of members from the other side. 
Deserters were sometimes pursued after their disengagement, which prolonged memberships 
and ultimately the conflicts. Dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization were 
prolonged.  
In the second case, we find no competition over geographical areas. The groups’ mobilization 
was first and foremost on the ideological level, and recruits of the groups did not know each 
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other, or members from the out-group. This naturally lowers in-group cohesion and out-group 
hostility. The only possible physical arena where PU and NDL could have interacted was 
through demonstrations, but the law enforcement did always control these events. Even though 
the internet and social media has become interesting channels of interactions, the thesis judges 
that the unilateral activities were so limited by legislation that it would have been very 
improbable to ever experience severe dynamics of HRR online.  
Second, the first case did also show a certain inter-group competition over supporters. Members 
could switch sides because the essential grievances were social issues, not ideological beliefs. 
Supporters from group side did sometimes develop resentment against former friends who 
joined the enemy side, aggravating the levels of conflicts and polarization. In the second case, 
Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League never fought for the same demographic 
cohort. While the NDL focused on the Christian community and the hooligan scene, PU tried 
to recruit vulnerable youngster from mosques and areas of the capital with a larger number of 
Muslims.  
Third, while the groups do show a certain degree of ideological interdependence, Profetens 
Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League were never in competition over existence. This 
(contextually) confirms the skepticism of certain scholars who have challenged the notion of 
symbiosis between counter-jihadism and radical Islamism. At the most, the Norwegian case 
shows a strong asymmetrical relationship. It is very uncertain that PU did benefit from the 
actions of the counter-jihadi movement in Norway between 2012 and 2014. When we 
additionally take into account that the NDL was also preoccupied by other actors that PU, the 












5.1. General approaches 
After reviewing Bjørgo and Gjelsvik’s summarizing paper about Norwegian research on 
radicalization, the author noticed that few had investigated the relationship between the counter-
Jihadi and radical Islamist movements, who, at a certain period, co-existed in the Norwegian 
society. Experiences between the EDL and al-Mujahiroun in Britain and Eatwell’s concept of 
Cumulative Extremism opened the question of whether their sister groups could ever have 
entered in similar dynamics in Norway. A short historical analysis showed that no dynamics of 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization had occurred between PU and NDL, but there had been a 
positive case of the phenomenon in the 1990s/2000s in Norway between neo-Nazis and anti-
racists.   
The author did therefore estimate that it would not be fruitful to focus on the mere outcome in 
the second case. Rather, the more interesting inquiry would be to uncover why HRR developed 
in the first case and not the second. Using Alex Schmid’s definition of radicalization (Schmid, 
2013), this thesis introduced conceptual changes to Cumulative Extremism to render the 
phenomenon more easily measurable. For instance, the new concept of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization incorporates indirect actions (group vs civilians), and inter-group dynamics 
online.  
The second step was to perform a comparative analysis, using Mill’s most different system 
design and temporal triangulation. Findings in Social Movement Theory and especially 
Donatella Della Porta’s “competitive escalation” pinpoint to factors who limit and facilitate 
inter-group radicalization. Three variables seem to have important effects for the process of 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization: Ideology, counter-radicalization measures and inter-
group competition. The thesis argues that these constitute political opportunity structures that 
either limit or facilitate HRR in the two cases, and generates three hypotheses before the 
analysis.  
Since there does not exist any significant quantitative data on the subject, a qualitative analysis 
was the most appropriate methodology. The radicalization process is also quite dynamic, 
complex, and human psychology in general is very hard to explain trough datasets. The 
information collected for the analysis has been through different forms of documents, like 




Hypothesis 1 – ideology  
The first independent variable that was subject for analysis was ideology. Donatella Della 
Porta’s states that this factor could create discursive opportunities for political violence and 
radicalization (Della Porta, 2013). In relation to the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization, theory highlighted two important components: perceptions of hostility and the 
acceptance of violence.  
In the first case, the first indicator supports H1. Mutual hate and stigmatization was a central 
driver in the 1990s/2000s. The neo-Nazis and anti-Racists organized around binary moral 
positions, and they eventually developed distinct styles of clothing and newspapers that tracked 
the activities of the counter-groups. The thesis argues for a symmetrical ideological relationship 
between the two factions, something that had been discovered by Bjørgo et al (2001), Fangen 
(2001) and others.  
Analyzing the first indicator in the second case furtherly supports the hypothesis. It seems like 
Profetens Ummah was unconcerned with the activities Norwegian radical right. The global 
repression of Muslims was caused by governmental interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Palestine and Syria (Michalsen, 2015). The Norwegian Defence League did not figure amongst 
the central factors of domestic repression; PU focused on the activities of the media, the police 
and politicians. In contrast, the primary concern of the NDL is the Islamization of Norway. 
However, the group did not specify what actors drive this process. This is simply not enough 
to create strong feelings of hate/alienation towards PU. The thesis concludes that the groups in 
the second case did not display a facilitating ideological relationship for dynamics of HRR.  
The second indicator analyzed was violence in the narrative. In the first case, the legitimization 
of “controlled” violence in street fights before 1994 and the escalations of it after was likely 
due to two things. First, the ideological component helped sustain and escalate conflicts until 
the murder of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001. Imported skinhead culture and hooliganism 
increased the acceptation of violence, and it became a legitimate tool of conflict resolution of 
both sides. The second mechanism of legitimization was the pre-radicalization of the radical 
left (with police forces) before the 1990s.   
In the second case, violent clashes between PU and NDL was an unlikely scenario. The 
Norwegian Defence League’s narrative rejected violence, most likely because of the de-
94 
 
legitimization of hateful acts/ideologies after Hermansen (2001) and Breivik (2011). Official 
figure in Norway distanced themselves from these types of actions, and so did several leaders 
of the NDL, who eventually had to leave the group. Ultimately, internal division does not 
solidify collective mobilization. Contrary to the NDL, Profetens Ummah promoted violence. 
However, they never acted violently on Norwegian soil despite warning about potential 
terrorism because of the country’s military interventions abroad. Instead, they exported 
violence to conflicts in the Middle East by facilitating transport for affiliates to the Islamic 
State. Thus, PU might have lost much of its potential for mobilization in a hypothetical HRR-
dynamic with the NDL, if it was ever possible.  
In sum, the second indicator furtherly confirms the first hypothesis. When there is no potential 
for violence between two groups, an escalation of conflicts in improbable. Nevertheless, one 
important consideration is that the thesis might have investigated two groups in their infant 
stages of HRR-dynamics. However, if manifestations of non-violent pressure and coercion 
indicate early stages of radicalization (Schmid, 2013), then the findings linked to the first 
indicator makes it very difficult to foresee that HRR could ever develop between PU and NDL. 
They never had any strategical incentive to engage in reciprocal, non-violent radicalism.  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Counter-radicalization  
The thesis expected the second hypothesis, measure of counter-radicalization, to be limiting for 
Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case and facilitating for HRR in the first 
case. The analysis therefore focused three indicators: legislation, training of agencies and the 
engagement of civil society.  
First, there was two important reforms of legislation that had an impact on both general 
radicalization as well as the group’s specific freedom of speech and action across the two cases. 
The first reforms came on the law on discrimination, or §135a. The new legislation protected 
discrimination again sexual orientation, religious beliefs and public statements offline. One 
example is Terje Sørlie’s appeal in 2000. This type of rhetoric would have had severe juridical 
consequences in today’s society. The 135a reforms had also important consequences to the 
freedom of speech of PU and NDL online, an arena that they regularly used for propaganda, 
recruitment and mobilization. In sum, PU and NDL had reduced freedom of speech compared 
to the groups in the 1990s/early 2000s. 
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The second indicator of legislation investigated is counter-terror legislation. Here, the 9/11 
attacks mark a turning point for several waves of legislative reforms against terrorism. Norway 
incorporated new pre-active laws against these types of actions, due to international 
expectations of cooperation and coordination. Before 2001, domestic legislation on terrorism 
did not specify types of actions, only motivation. Between 2002 and 2008, new laws increased 
sanctions against terrorism, like financing, planning, recruitment, training and encouragement 
of terrorism became criminal offenses. These new reforms had consequences for the freedom 
of action of PU and NDL, and would probably also have reduced the levels of violence and 
escalations in the 1990s/early 2000s.  
The counter-terror laws very especially detrimental for Profetens Ummah. Many of PU’s 
leaders and prominent members were arrested/expatriated due to criminal activities. Post-
reforms, they were ruled as acts of terrorism. The criminalization of departures did also 
certainly have a preventive effect for some who wanted to join the Syrian conflict. The radical 
Islamists group weakened through the reforms of anti-terror legislation. Ultimately, unilateral 
incapacity hinders mobilization and bilateral radicalization. 
Second, the training of agencies did also impede the groups in the second case. In 1997, the 
EXIT project was initiated in Norway. It proved to be very efficient against the radicalization 
and activities of neo-Nazis. The thesis concludes that one reason that Horizontal Reciprocal 
Radicalization could have developed so long in case one was because there was no existing 
system of prevention before EXIT. However, until 2012, preventative measures from the first 
initiatives like empowerment conversations were commonly used. The findings indicates that 
these probably had a long-term effect on the radicalization of minors, making it more difficult 
for the groups in the second case to recruit vulnerable youth without them being intercepted at 
early stages and rehabilitated. 
In 2014, the Norwegian government implemented a final version of the Action Plan 
(Handlingsplanen) to counter the new threats of radicalization on a national scale. The new 
measures suffered from the contemporary context. Both the radical-rights and radical Islamists 
were older, more ideologically driven, and there was in reality a need for more specific 
ideological knowledge to disengage them. However, the plan from 2014 did benefit from the 
measures created in the first case. There was also natural causes for disengagement and 
generally lower levels of mobilization in the second instance: legislation punished radicalism 
much more than before (push-factor), and the older age acted as natural disengagement due to 
societal expectations (pull-factor).  
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In 2005, agencies like PST got increased freedom of surveillance and monitoring, the 
prohibition of these became repealed. This gave Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste the liberty to 
infiltrate and monitor PU and NDL. For instance, the intelligence services led highly aggressive 
policies against radical Islamism ever since 2002. Empowerment conversations, a very efficient 
preventive tool from the 1990s, was used in radical milieus years before 2012. Through 
infiltration within both the Norwegian Defence League and Profetens Ummah, the secret 
services did also have the possibility to map and control the entirety of the individuals who they 
perceived as potentially dangerous. By crushing leaderships and controlling nearly all 
members, they weakened unilateral group radicalization and thus probably limited possible 
HRR dynamics.  
 
Hypothesis 3 - Competition 
In their model on radicalization, McCauley and Moskalenko find that inter-group competition 
could have a facilitating effect on inter-group mechanisms (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 
424-425). Due to theory and the known outcomes across the two cases, that the thesis developed 
a third hypothesis before the analytical part that expected more inter-group competition in the 
first case than the second, something that would facilitate Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization 
in the 1990s/2000s and limiting the process in 2012-2014.  
The thesis finds the geographical closeness in the first case was an important facilitator for 
reciprocal dynamics of radicalization and sustained conflicts. In contrast, the groups were not 
in constant interaction in the second case. The only arena in which they could have met 
physically was demonstrations: violent clashes occurred in Britain between the EDL and al-
Mujahiroun in these events. The internet might have become a new arena for bilateral 
exchanges, but the preventive effects of legislation limited the groups’ freedom of speech 
online. 
Strategies of recruitment were different across the two cases. In the 1990s/2000s, the factions 
did sometimes exchange supporters, and they knew each other personally in many cases. This 
created feeling of treason, and revenge, increasing polarization and hostility between the sides. 
In the second case, the groups did not recruit from the same areas. In-group cohesion is then 
not as strong as social ties that we see in the first case due to local co-existence. The NDL and 
PU recruited from different demographic cohorts. The competition over supporters in the 
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second case was never as clear as in the first; it seems like the common strategy for recruitment 
was vulnerability.  
Lastly, some sub-groups within the neo-Nazi and anti-Racist movements really did hate each 
other. Their existence and identities had their base in the counter group, but this “positive 
relationship” was also driven by the fact that they wanted to eliminate the other side. There was 
a competition for existence, in many ways an ideological and socially incompatibility. One of 
the main reasons for this was personal ties, also created by geographical closeness. The thesis 
does not find this type of relationship between Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence 
League.  
In sum, the collective effect of the independent variables was limiting for HRR, indicating that 
Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League were very unlikely to develop dynamics 
of inter-group radicalization like the factions in the 1990s/early 2000s. This conclusion is 
supported by the confirmation of H1, H2 and H3.  
Not only does the thesis find that radicalism had very little chance of manifesting in the second 
case of inter-group dynamics, but the political opportunity structures analyzed did also have an 
impact on unilateral group structures. For once, the ideological analysis shows that the NDL 
had no violent intentions. Second, even though Profetens Ummah did warn of terrorism, the 
thesis argues that specific legislation and the strategies of intelligence agencies suffocated the 
radical Islamic group. Ultimately, PST had mapped both radical groups and did have a 
significant control over them through constant monitoring, surveillance and infiltration.  
Nevertheless, the groups were still sources of danger. Not primarily as collectives, rather as 
sources of influence for lone-wolf actors. The thesis argues that given the political opportunity 
structures in the Norwegian context, the only possible manifestation of violent radicalism in 
this period in time was unexpected solitary/small group terrorism. This is reflected through 
Breivik’s actions from 2011, but also the charges against a radical right individual in 2013 who 
displayed violent intentions against the parliament (Stortinget) (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17; 
Vestrum et al, 2013).  
 
5.3. Looking ahead 
This thesis has tried to explain why two cases of inter-group interactions ended had very 
different outcomes of radicalization. The conclusion is that Profetens Ummah and the 
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Norwegian Defence League did not have the political opportunity structures necessary for 
entering dynamics of reciprocal radicalization. The positive case from the 1990s/early 2000s 
occurred between the radical left and the radical right. While dynamics of HRR has only been 
observed between the EDL and al-Mujahiroun, the radical-left and radical right have entered 
similar processes several times before, and in different countries. What can we expect in the 
years to come? 
When it comes to the relationship between counter-jihadism and radical Islamism, there are 
some countries that could experience different forms of radicalism. If the ideology has the 
necessary facilitating traits, and counter-radicalization does not totally limit their freedom, then 
it might be possible to develop HRR. One obvious necessary condition is that we need two 
active factions in co-existence. A second factor is transparency. Countries with massively 
populated cities render efficient counter-radicalization very difficult. Finally, a third facilitator 
could be the number of immigrants in metropoles. Roger Eatwell states that “[…] issues related 
to immigration are undoubtedly an important starting point for understand the appeal of the 
BNP and UKIP” (Eatwell, 2006: 206). 
There are some countries in Western Europe that display high levels of polarization, significant 
populations and active forces on both ideological sides. In Belgium, we have seen the presence 
of Sharia4Belgium (Bouchaud, 2015) and strong right-wing populism in Wlaams Blok 
(Blommaert, 2016). In France, there has been numerous radical Islamist terrorist attacks by 
domestic cells and lone wolfs since January 2015. As late as 17 October this year, 10 radical-
right individuals were arrested for planning multiple terrorist attacks against immigrants, 
politicians and mosques (Joffrin, 2017).  
Excluding the recent terrorist attack that killed 12 people, officials in Germany also argue that 
they expect more attacks from radical Islamist individuals or groups. Recent reports find that 
there are 10,000 Salafists in the country (Crosse & Birsel, 2017). In June 2017, the national 
police uncovered far-right paramilitary training camps with guns, ammunition and drugs 
(Dearden, 2017). England, France, Germany and Belgium have another thing in common: they 
all have a great number of foreign fighters (Loveluck, 2015). If their return does lead to a 
significant increase in terrorist attacks, then it could spark strong reactions in radical-right 
factions, and maybe activate HRR processes.  
Lastly, we also see strong reactions against the wave of refugees in Eastern Europe. The 12th 
of November 2017, 60 000 nationalists marched in the streets of Warsaw with slogans like 
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“Refugees get out” and “White Europe of brotherly nations” (Taylor, 2017). If we observe 
increased radicalism towards refugees and camps, it could very well lead to radicalization, 
polarization, acts of revenge and escalations of violent conflicts in the future. This trend has 
slowly become a reality; the German interior ministry registered 3533 attacks against migrants 
and asylum hostels in 2016 (BBC, 2017).  
Inter-group radicalization is still, at a young stage of its conceptual development. As we see in 
Europe, Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization will remain relevant as a sub-field of 
radicalization. However, measuring and understanding these dynamics in different contexts will 
require academic interest, and conceptual changes. Here are some proposed measures that could 
gain an academic importance in the time to come.  
First, the concept of HRR in this thesis focuses mainly on direct inter-group radicalization. In 
reality, the processes are far more complex. For instance, strategies of provocation aim non-
radical targets, through hate crimes, political violence and terrorism. The resulting escalations 
of sustained HRR dynamics could be hindered at early stages if we can observe early indicators 
of inter-group radicalization. The internet has also become an important arena for radical 
groups, thus more knowledge about online inter-group interactions is necessary to tackle HRR.  
HRR dynamics can unfold between multiple factions in complex dynamics. Third parties can 
facilitate pre-radicalization, and possibly sparking legitimizations of violence in militant 
factions. This happened between the police and the radical left in Norway in the 1980s. How 
we obtain moderation instead of radicalization could be a function of specific preventive 
policies of counter-radicalization. Finally, individuals in group-conflicts aren’t necessarily 
radicalized; there are also chances that many are simply criminal, without any ideological 
convictions. Conflicts then resemble gang-disputes. We therefore need increased clarity in the 
concept of HRR to avoid systematically creating false positives.  
Second, we can use the empirical findings related to HRR in different national contexts, to find 
tendencies and necessary conditions that do possess general explanatory power. In this way, it 
will be easier to foresee different scenarios. What groups are prone to engage in reciprocal 
radicalization? Will it be counter-jihadism and radical Islamists, or will anti-racists and neo-
Nazi- clashes become a general trend in Europe? The recent mobilization of “Den Nordiske 
Mostandsbevegelsen” has to be taken seriously in itself, but also in connection to potential 
violent reactions by counter-parts. As many as 600 participated in a demonstration in Sweden 
(Falun) in April 2017 (Johansen & Thjømøe, 2017). 10 000 counter-protesters (many radical-
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left affiliated) were expect to mobilize against a NMB-march in Gøteborg in September 2017 
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